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ABSTRACT 
Does trader leverage exacerbate the liquidity comovement that we observe during crises? Using a 
regression discontinuity design, we exploit threshold rules governing margin eligibility in India to 
analyze the impact of trader leverage on systematic liquidity.  We find that trader leverage causes sharp 
increases in comovement during severe market downturns, explaining about one third of the increase 
in liquidity commonality during these periods. Consistent with downward price pressure due to 
deleveraging, we also find that trader leverage causes stocks to exhibit large increases in return 
comovement during these periods of market stress. 
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1. Introduction 
Does trader leverage exacerbate the liquidity comovement that we observe during crises? 
Commonality in liquidity, the tendency of the liquidity of individual stocks to move together, has been 
well-documented. Recent papers in the literature (e.g., Karolyi, Lee, and Van Dijk (2012) and Hameed, 
Kang, and Viswanathan (2010)) also report large increases in commonality during crises, both in U.S. 
markets and in markets around the world. The fact that the systematic component of liquidity 
increases during crises is alarming because these are precisely the times during which traders need 
liquidity the most. Therefore, it is important to understand the causes of the heightened comovement. 
There are competing explanations for the increased commonality in liquidity that we observe 
during crisis periods. Liquidity comovement might increase when there is market-wide panic selling 
due to economy-wide changes in fundamentals or increased aggregate uncertainty. Alternatively, it 
could be due to frictions related to traders’ ability to maintain levered positions when market prices 
decline. While both of these explanations of increased commonality in liquidity during crises are 
plausible, disentangling them poses substantial empirical challenges. To assess the extent to which 
traders’ leverage (a form of funding) matters, one would first need to observe variation in trader 
leverage. Second, and more importantly, one would have to separate the effects of deleveraging from 
other portfolio demands. This is particularly challenging because, during downturns, investors may 
liquidate their positions due to negative sentiment or increased uncertainty, which can also affect 
liquidity comovement. 
Although the funding-based explanation for heightened liquidity comovement in bad times 
has received substantial attention in the theoretical literature (e.g., Kyle and Xiong (2001), Gromb and 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2868007 
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Vayanos (2002), Morris and Shin (2004), Weill (2007), and Gromb and Vayanos (2009), Brunnermeier 
and Pederson (2009)), we still have a paucity of empirical evidence of its importance. In this paper, we 
aim to fill this gap by examining the impact of trader leverage on liquidity comovement using the 
margin trading regulations in India.  
There are a number of reasons why margin trading in India provides a useful lens through 
which we can examine frictions due to leverage. First, margin traders might face difficulties in meeting 
their margin requirements and maintaining their positions when the values of their portfolios decline. 
Second, brokers may become less willing to provide margin debt during periods of market stress. Both 
of these can lead to trader deleveraging, which can consume liquidity.  The additional advantage of 
the Indian context is that the regulatory setting helps us overcome the empirical challenges discussed 
above. In India, only some exchange-traded stocks are eligible for margin trading. Importantly, 
eligibility is based on a well-defined cutoff. The discreteness of the margin trading rules provides a 
discontinuity (see Lee and Lemieux (2010)) in the ability of traders to use leverage and therefore 
provides us an opportunity to perform a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to identify the causal 
effect of trader leverage on commonality in liquidity. 
Like other stock markets throughout the world, Indian equity markets are characterized by 
liquidity commonality that tends to increase during downturns. This pattern is obvious in Figure 1, 
which shows the time series of commonality along with Indian stock market returns. It is clear from 
the figure that there is a dramatic increase in commonality (nearly doubles) when there are large drops 
in market returns. Figure 2 shows the same time series of commonality, but this time for the subsample 
of stocks that are very close to the margin trading eligibility threshold. The patterns in Figure 2 are 
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even more revealing than those in Figure 1. During almost all market downturns, the liquidity 
commonality in margin eligible stocks is much higher than that of margin ineligible stocks. During 
other periods, there are small (if any) differences between the two groups. The figures provide simple, 
yet striking, evidence consistent with the Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) hypothesis that funding 
constraints in bad times drive commonality.  
In the formal regression analysis, we use regression discontinuity design (RDD) to identify the 
causal effect of trader leverage. Consistent with the theoretical literature, we find that trader leverage 
exacerbates commonality in stock liquidity.  Moreover, this effect is solely driven by crisis periods. The 
magnitudes of our findings are economically large. For instance, when we examine commonality of 
effective spreads, we find that margin-eligible stocks experience an additional 30% increase in liquidity 
comovement during crisis periods. During non-crisis periods, the impact of trader leverage is 
insignificant. Our results are robust to a battery of tests in which we control for various stock-level 
characteristics. Importantly, we also conduct placebo tests in which we repeat our analysis around 
false eligibility cutoffs as well as market rallies and we find no significant effects.   
We start our analysis by examining commonality in liquidity because we still do not have a full 
understanding of the main causes of liquidity crises. However, it is also important to point out that 
trader leverage can simultaneously drive both commonality in liquidity and commonality in returns 
(e.g., Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Geanakoplos (2010)). 
Therefore, we extend our analysis to examine the impact of margin trading on return comovement. 
Consistent with downward price pressure due to the deleveraging of traders who rely on borrowing, 
we find that trader leverage amplifies increases in return comovement during crisis periods. Similar to 
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the findings on commonality in liquidity, we find that the economic effect of trader leverage on return 
comovement is substantial (in crisis periods, there is an additional 28% increase in return comovement 
due to leverage) and that trader leverage affects return comovement only during periods of market 
stress.   
After establishing the causal impact of trader leverage on commonality in liquidity and 
commonality in returns, we conduct a number of mechanism tests. In addition to helping us 
understand the drivers of the patterns that we observe in the data, these tests also allow us to assess 
the extent to which the same economic forces drive commonality in liquidity and returns. If the main 
findings are due to frictions related to binding collateral constraints and deleveraging, we would expect 
the increases in comovement during crises to be strongest between the stocks in which traders tend 
to use leverage. That is, we would expect pairwise correlations in stocks’ liquidity as well as returns to 
be higher within the set of margin-eligible stocks. This is precisely what we find. These findings are 
consistent with margin traders, as a group, simultaneously unwinding their positions in multiple stocks 
when the value of their collateral falls. 
Our data allow us to zoom in further to understand potential cross-stock linkages. We can 
observe, on a daily basis, the entire portfolio of stocks that each trader has financed with margin debt. 
These data include unique trader and broker identification numbers, thus allow us to identify margin 
trader and broker linkages across stocks. Using this information, we examine the importance of 
common traders and common brokers on heightened commonality in liquidity and returns during 
crises. Both the broker and trader channels are of interest. At the trader level, leverage-induced funding 
constraints might force a trader to liquidate positions in multiple stocks in her portfolio. At the broker 
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level, a negative shock to the overall market might make the broker less willing to provide capital to 
its customers. We find that margin-eligible stocks that are more connected, through either common 
margin traders or common brokers, experience much larger increases in pairwise comovement in both 
liquidity and returns during severe market downturns. The estimated economic effects of common 
brokers are larger than the economic effects of common traders. In addition to revealing the 
underlying forces behind the main results, this finding indicates that policies which aim to recapitalize 
or subsidize lenders (instead of borrowers) might be more effective in mitigating systematic liquidity 
crises.  
Our findings contribute to the growing literature on commonality in liquidity. This line of 
research initially focused on documenting pervasive commonality (Chordia, Roll Subrahmanyam 
(2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), Huberman and Kalka (2001)). Subsequent work focused on 
distinguishing its cause. One strand of theoretical literature points to funding constraints of traders.1 
These studies predict that funding constraints, which include constraints due to margin requirements, 
drive commonality in liquidity during market downturns. Hameed, Kang, and Vishwanathan (2010) 
and Coughenour and Saad (2004) support this view. Specifically, Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan 
(2010) report that commonality increases following large market declines. Coughenour and Saad 
(2004) focus on New York Stock Exchange specialists, who provide liquidity in all of the stocks in 
which they make markets, and show that liquidity commonality is higher when stocks share specialists, 
especially when specialists are capital constrained.  
                                                            
1 These include works by Kyle and Xiong (2001), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Morris and Shin (2004), Weill 
(2007), Gromb and Vayanos (2009) and Brunnermeier and Petersen (2009), among others.  
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While the findings in the papers described above are consistent with the idea that funding 
constraints drive commonality, the overall evidence to date is mixed.  Another line of work emphasizes 
the importance of correlated trading demands that arise from similarities in investors’ styles, tastes, or 
sentiments.2 Karolyi, Lee, and Van Dijk (2012) find that intuitive proxies for funding constraints 
(variables such as local interest rates) are not strongly associated with heightened commonality in 
liquidity in bad times, while turnover commonality (which can be interpreted as a proxy for correlated 
taste) and foreign flows have considerable explanatory power.  Although not paying specific attention 
to crisis periods, Kamara, Lou, and Sadka (2008) and Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks (2016) find that 
commonality is higher when institutional ownership is higher.  
One important distinction between these two views is the asymmetry in their predictions. 
Different from correlated trading due to common investor styles or tastes, which can be important in 
any market environment, the commonality that arises from funding constraints is expected to be 
concentrated in times of market downturns, when funding constraints are binding.  This asymmetry 
helps with the interpretation of any empirical findings. 
Unlike the previous studies, we use a regression discontinuity design that allows us to isolate 
the impact of the leverage channel from confounding effects – an empirical challenge faced by 
previous studies.  This makes it possible to make causal statements about the impact of leverage on 
comovement.  Our main finding is that trader leverage dramatically increases commonality, but only 
during crisis periods.  This is not driven by index stocks or differences in ownership structure (such 
                                                            
2 The idea is that, for instance, due to benchmarking practices, financial institutions tend to have a taste for index stocks, 
and this exacerbates liquidity comovement across these stocks.  
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as institutional and foreign ownership), which indicates that leverage channel is distinct from prior 
findings in the literature. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to provide evidence on 
the impact of trader leverage on commonality in liquidity.  
Our paper is also related to recent work by Kahraman and Tookes (2016), who use the same 
sample of stocks that we use in this paper, but they examine the impact of trader leverage on stock 
liquidity levels.  They find that, on average, margin-eligible stocks have higher liquidity.  In extended 
analysis, they also find that this effect reverses during times of crisis. Different from Kahraman and 
Tookes (2016), this paper focuses on comovement. Liquidity levels and comovement are fundamentally 
different and can be driven by different forces. While Kahraman and Tookes (2016) report that trader 
leverage has an impact on liquidity levels during all time periods, in this paper, we find that it affects 
liquidity comovement only during periods of market stress. We introduce new data at the margin 
trader and broker level, which helps us uncover the mechanism behind these findings. Another 
important difference from Kahraman and Tookes (2016) is that we also analyze returns. A new finding 
that emerges from our analysis is that, while commonality in stock returns and commonality in liquidity 
are not strongly correlated in normal times, due to leverage, they become highly linked during times 
of market stress.  
Finally, our findings on return comovement add to the literature on financial contagion. 
Examples include Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2005) and Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Ramadorai (2012), 
who document heightened return comovement during crisis periods in international markets.  Boyson, 
Stahel, Stulz (2010) and Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon (2012) provide evidence consistent with 
contagion among hedge funds. While the theory of contagion is well-studied, empirical evidence on 
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its underlying causes is not conclusive. In this paper, we find that trader leverage is one driver that 
serves to exacerbate the excess return comovement that we observe during crisis periods. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the regulations that determine margin 
eligibility in India. Section 3 describes the data and the regression discontinuity approach. The main 
results are in Section 4. Section 5 presents mechanism analyses. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Margin trading in India 
Margin trading allows traders to borrow in order to purchase shares. In India, the margin 
trading system is regulated by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). The current system, 
in which margin trading is allowed in stocks that meet certain eligibility requirements, has been in 
place since April 2004.3 Under current SEBI guidelines, two criteria must be met for a stock to be 
eligible. The first is that the stock must have traded on at least 80% of the trading days over the past 
six months. The second requirement provides the identification that we need for the empirical analysis.  
The stock’s average impact cost, defined as the absolute value of the percentage change in price from 
the bid-offer midpoint that would be caused by an order size of 100,000 rupees (approximately $2,000 
during our sample period), must be less than or equal to 1%. The impact cost used to determine 
eligibility is based on the average of estimated impact costs over the past six months. These are 
calculated at random ten-minute intervals four times per day.  
                                                            
3 Prior to the current system, the primary borrowing mechanism for traders in India was a system called Badla. Under 
Badla, trade settlements were rolled from one period to another. The system was eventually banned because it lacked key 
risk management standards, such as maintenance margins.   
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Stocks that meet the impact cost and trading frequency requirements are categorized as Group 1 
stocks and are eligible for margin trading. Stocks that fail to meet the impact cost requirement, but 
meet the trading frequency requirement, are categorized as Group 2 stocks. All remaining stocks are 
classified into Group 3. Group 2 and Group 3 stocks are ineligible for margin trading (i.e., no new 
margin trades are allowed as of the effective date).4 Impact costs and the resulting group assignments 
are calculated on the 15th day of each month. The new groups are announced and become effective 
on the 1st day of the subsequent month. For example, when determining eligibility for the month of 
December, regulators use data from May 15 through November 15 to determine each stock’s 
eligibility. The resulting group assignments are announced on December 1 and are effective for the 
entire month of December. For stocks that meet the 80% trading frequency requirement, the 
probability of eligibility shifts unequivocally from 0 to 1 at the 1% impact cost cutoff. This feature of 
the system allows us to employ a sharp regression discontinuity design (i.e., the probability of 
assignment jumps from 0% to 1% at the threshold). 
There are alternative ways that traders can obtain leverage in India outside of the formal 
margin trading system, but these channels tend to be costly or available for only a small subset of 
stocks. For example, for a stock to be eligible for futures and options (F&O) trading, there are 
additional market capitalization, free float, trading activity, and impact cost requirements. As of 
December 2012, we find only 140 stocks that are eligible for F&O trading (whereas 620 stocks are 
eligible for margin trading in the same month). Investors can also borrow from nonbanking finance 
                                                            
4 When a stock moves from Group 1 to Group 2 or 3, no new margin trades are allowed as the effective date.  However, 
investors who already have outstanding margin positions can take time to unwind them. 
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companies (NBFCs), which are regulated by RBI (the central bank), to finance the purchase of any 
security. However, NBFC loans typically carry higher interest rates and other terms that are less 
favorable to investors. It is important to note that, even if these alternative channels are used, their 
existence would create bias against finding significant effects of margin eligibility. 
For eligible stocks, the most important requirements for margin trading in India are similar to 
those in the United States. Minimum initial margins are set at 50% (i.e., a margin trader may borrow 
up to 50% of the purchase price), and minimum maintenance margins are set at 40% (i.e., prices may 
fall without a margin call as long as the loan is less than 60% of the value of the collateral in the margin 
account). Unlike in the United States, stock-level margin position data are made publicly available on 
a next-day basis. We exploit this information in our analysis of the impact of margin trading intensity 
later in the paper.5 Margin trading rules are distinct from the other trading rules in India.6 This is 
important because it allows us to interpret any findings in terms of a trader leverage channel, rather 
than something else. 
2. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
                                                            
5 For a more detailed discussion of the margin trading system in India, see the Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(2012).  See also the referenced SEBI circular dated March 11, 2003:  http://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/mar-
2003/circular-for-risk-management-for-t-2-rolling-settlement_15836.html. 
6 Group 1 membership in India has one additional regulatory advantage in the very short run. For non-institutional traders, 
trade settlement with the broker occurs at day t+1. Collateral to cover potential losses prior to full payment at settlement 
is collected at the time of trade (this is called a VAR margin). VAR margin requirements are lower for Group 1 stocks than 
for Group 2 and Group 3 stocks. Thus, Group 1 stocks require less short-term capital. The existence of an additional 
source of leverage does not change our overall interpretation of Group 1 membership because the margin financing 
eligibility and the low VAR margin requirements both involve shocks to the availability of leverage, in the same direction. 
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The initial sample consists of all equities trading on the National Stock Exchange of India 
(NSE) from April 2004 through December 2012. The master list of stocks is from the NSE. These 
are monthly files that contain the International Securities Identification Number (ISIN), stock symbol, 
impact cost measure, and the NSE group assignment for each stock. The daily data are also from the 
NSE and include symbol, security code, closing price (in Indian Rs), high price, low price, total shares 
traded, and the value of shares traded. We obtain intraday transactions and quote data for all Group 
1 and Group 2 NSE stocks from Thomson Reuters Tick History. These data include inside quotes 
and all transactions during our sample period.7 We merge the Thomson Reuters Tick data with the 
other datasets using a map of RIC codes (Thomson unique identifier) to ISINs that was provided to 
us by Thomson. To ensure reliability of the matching, we remove all matches for which the absolute 
difference between the closing price on the NSE daily files and the last transaction price in the 
Thomson Tick data is more than 10%. We also remove cancelled trades and entries with bid or ask 
prices equal to zero. We require non-missing price and volume information for at least 12 trading days 
in a given month.  
 We obtain two datasets with information on daily outstanding margin positions. Both are from 
the NSE. The first dataset reports the stock-level total outstanding margin trading positions at the end 
of each trading day. These data are available throughout our sample period. The second dataset 
contains trader-level data with outstanding margin positions for each stock and trader. These data 
include unique trader and broker identification numbers and allow us to identify margin trader and 
                                                            
7 Fong, Holden, and Trzcinka (2014) Thomson Reuters Tick compare prices to those in Datastream and confirm that 
the Thomson Tick data are of high quality. 
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broker linkages across stocks. The trader-level data are available only for the 2007 to 2010 subperiod. 
We complement the NSE data with company information from Prowess, a database of Indian firms, 
which covers approximately 80% of the NSE stocks. Prowess provides information on shares 
outstanding, index membership, ownership structure (at the quarterly frequency), and trade 
suspensions. Prowess data are available throughout our sample period. 
Following the related studies in the literature, we impose sample restrictions to ensure data 
quality. First, we exclude stocks with extreme price levels (we use the 1% tails of the distribution). 
This restriction is similar to the restriction imposed in studies using U.S. data, which commonly focus 
only on stock prices above $5 and less than $999. Second, we exclude the stocks that have been 
suspended from trade, since trading irregularities in suspended stocks are likely to contaminate our 
liquidity measures. Finally, although we do not observe corporate actions such as stock splits, 
bankruptcy, or mergers, we aim to remove these events from the analysis. To do so, we omit stocks 
with percentage changes in shares outstanding that are greater than 50% (in absolute value) and 
exclude stocks with temporary ISIN identifiers, as this appears to be an indication of a corporate 
action. 
Throughout the analysis, we focus on Group 1 and Group 2 stocks (as noted above, Group 3 
stocks are not frequently traded). There are 1,842 unique ISINs in Groups 1 and 2 during our sample 
period. Of these, 1,500 are in Group 1 at some point during our sample period, and 1,347 are in Group 
2. Of the 1,842 stocks in the sample, the majority appear in the local samples at some point. For 
instance, in the local sample used in the R2espread (the commonality measure using effective spreads) 
analysis, there are 1,063 unique stock observations, and 954 of these are in the treatment (Group 1) 
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sample at least once. This observation is important to the overall interpretation because it shows that, 
although our RDD approach focuses only on stocks close to the threshold during a given month, the 
analysis is not constrained to only a small subset of stocks. 
For every stock and month in our sample, we begin the analysis by calculating two widely-
used measures of liquidity: average percentage effective bid-ask spread and the Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity ratio. Effective spread (espread) is defined as 100* .5 * ( ) * 2..5 * ( )
transaction price bid ask
bid ask
 
  The 
bid and ask prices reflect the prevailing quotes at the time of the trade. The effective spread captures 
the difference between the transaction price and the fundamental value for the average trade. The 
effective spreads that we calculate reflect the average daily effective spreads, based on all transactions 
that occur during the month.  
The Amihud illiquidity variable (illiq) is defined as 
ret1000000* ,*p vol  where 
( ) ( 1)ret ;( 1)
p t p t
p t
    p is closing price on day t; and vol is the (rupee) trading volume on day t. Illiq 
captures the change in price generated by daily trading activity of 1 million rupees. This measure is 
widely used in the literature because it requires only daily data and does well capturing intraday 
measures of the price impact of trades (Hasbrouck (2009) and Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka 
(2009)). Following Amihud (2002), we winsorize the measure at the 1% and 99% levels (based on the 
full sample distribution), and we also remove observations in which daily trading volume is less than 
100 shares. The latter restriction impacts only 1% of the full sample of daily data.  Because our focus 
is on a non-U.S. sample of stocks, we follow Lesmond (2005), who also examines the Amihud (2002) 
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illiquidity measure using international data, and we impose price filters to remove potentially erroneous 
data from the returns calculations. In particular, whenever the closing price is +/- 50% of the previous 
closing price, we set that day’s price and the previous price equal to missing. As in Karolyi, Lee, and 
Van Dijk (2012) we take logs to reduce the impact of outliers. 
If margin traders tend to delever during downturns, the resulting order imbalances are likely 
to cause increases in both bid-ask spreads and the price impact of trading.8 
 
3.2. Commonality Measure 
We use the daily liquidity measures for all Group 1 and Group 2 stocks to construct the 
commonality in liquidity measure for each stock and month. We define commonality in liquidity as 
the R2 statistic from a regression of stock i’s daily liquidity innovations on market liquidity innovations. 
We choose to focus on R2 rather than liquidity betas, which are also used in the commonality in 
liquidity literature, because liquidity betas estimated at the stock-month level (a frequency crucial to 
our identification strategy) would introduce excessive noise in the analysis. The papers that use 
liquidity betas estimate them using data over a full year or more (e.g., Kamara et. al (2008), Hameed 
et. al (2010), Koch et. al (2016)). Similar to our paper, Karolyi, Lee, and Van Dijk (2012) are interested 
in commonality at the monthly horizon, and they define commonality based on the R2 statistic.  
Because, in principle, a high R2 can result from either a strong positive or a strong negative correlation 
with the market, later in the paper, we also examine liquidity correlations (an alternative commonality 
                                                            
8 Chordia et al. (2002) find that order imbalances reduce liquidity, for instance, captured by bid-ask spreads.  
This is consistent with the idea that imbalances introduce additional inventory costs to market makers.  
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measure) both with the overall market as well as within Groups 1 and 2.  Doing so allows us to clarify 
both the direction and source of any observed commonality. 
Along the lines of the approach in Karolyi, Lee, and Van Dijk (2012), we first calculate liquidity 
innovations based on a first-stage stock-level regression of daily liquidity on variables known to affect 
liquidity. Using data for each stock i on day d during month t, we estimate:  
 , , , , 1 , , , , .i t d i i t d i i t d i t dLiquidity Liquidity X       (1) 
Xt is a vector of indicator variable to indicate day-of-week, month, and whether the trading day falls 
near a holiday. It also includes a time trend. The daily regression residuals, denoted , , .i t d , are the 
liquidity innovations that we examine. This method is also used to pre-whiten the liquidity data in 
Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2005) and Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010). Market 
liquidity innovations ( , , .m t d ) are defined as the equally weighted average innovations for all Group 1 
and Group 2 stocks in the market. We choose to equally weight the liquidity innovations in this paper 
in order to avoid potential bias that might result from the fact that Group 1 stocks tend to be larger 
than Group 2 stocks and would therefore receive more weight in the market liquidity innovation 
calculation. 
In the second step, for each stock and calendar month, we use daily data to generate a time 
series of monthly R2 statistics from the following regression: , , 1 , , , , .i t d i m t d i t d       This R2 measure 
is also used in Karolyi, Lee, and Van Dijk (2012) and captures the extent to which the liquidity of a 
given stock moves with liquidity of the market. We denote these commonality measures as R2espread 
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and R2illiq for the regressions using effective spread and the Amihud (2002) ratio as liquidity measures, 
respectively. A high R2 is indicative of high commonality in liquidity. As we emphasize in the 
introduction, our analysis mostly focuses on the Group 1 and Group 2 stocks that lie near the impact 
cost cutoff of 1%. 
We also calculate R2return, a measure of commonality in returns. R2return is defined as the R2 
from a regression of the daily returns of stock i on (equal-weighted) market returns during month t. 
After establishing the basic results for commonality in liquidity, we extend our analysis to returns since 
trader leverage can also play an important role in returns comovement.  
It is useful to start by summarizing a couple of important patterns that we observe in the 
margin position data. First, we observe a significant decline in outstanding margin positions during 
the global financial crisis, consistent with the intense deleveraging commonly reported in the press. 
For example, from the first quarter of 2008 to the last quarter of that year, we find that outstanding 
margin debt declined by approximately 70%.  Second, we find that, while margin traders are contrarian 
traders who provide liquidity during normal times, they become momentum traders who consume 
liquidity during severe downturns. For instance, there are 38% more contrarian trades than 
momentum trades in the overall sample. In stark contrast, during crises, momentum trades are 85% 
more likely than contrarian trades.9 Motivated by these findings, we aim to understand whether margin 
trading and deleveraging cause liquidity and return comovement, particularly during market 
downturns. 
                                                            
9 Kahraman and Tookes (2016) formally show this using daily stock-level margin positions data. We provide evidence 
consistent with their result using the trader-level data. 
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3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides basic summary statistics.  We report market- and stock-level information for 
the full sample, as well as subsamples that are defined according to whether a given month 
corresponds to a severe market downturn. “Severe downturns” refers to months in which Indian 
market returns (i.e., CNX 500 returns) are below the 10th decile returns, which corresponds to a one-
month market return of -9% or less.10  Panel A of Table 1 reports that the median monthly market 
return during these periods is -13.2%, with an interquartile range of -18.9% to -10.5%.  “Outside of 
downturns” refers to all months outside of severe downturn periods. Panel A of Table 1 reports 
median monthly market return of 2.9%, with an interquartile range of -1.2% to 7.4%, outside of severe 
downturns.  
Panel A of Table 1 also reports monthly market liquidity levels, defined as the equal-weighted 
average daily effective spread (espread) or Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio (illiq) of all Group 1 and 
Group 2 stocks during month t.  From the table, it is clear that market liquidity is lower during severe 
downturns. For instance, consistent with previous work by Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010), 
we observe a 40% increase in espread and a 35% increase in illiq when there are large market declines.  
Panels B, C and D of Table 1 show statistics of the commonality measures for the local 
samples of Group 1 and Group 2 stocks. Consistent with the literature, Panel B reveals that all stocks 
exhibit commonality, although the average R2 measures are slightly higher for Group 1 stocks than for 
Group 2 stocks. The average R2espread is 0.146 for Group 1 stocks and 0.138 for Group 2 stocks. For 
                                                            
10 In addition to capturing the recent financial crisis of 2008, this definition also captures severe market downturns that 
occurred in India during 2005, 2006 as well as in late 2011. 
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R2illiq, these values are 0.139 and 0.136, respectively. The more interesting variation appears when one 
examines extreme downturns. During these periods, commonality in all stocks increases. However, 
the effect is much larger for Group 1 stocks, for which commonality using the R2espread measure 
almost doubles and commonality based on R2illiq increases by 50%. These changes are 28%–40% 
lower for Group 2 stocks than they are for Group 1 stocks. Not surprisingly, the statistics in Panel B 
are consistent with Figure 2, which shows the time series of commonality for the local samples.  The 
average differences in commonality between Group 1 and Group 2 stocks are driven almost entirely 
by crisis periods.  
Table 1, Panel C describes commonality in liquidity, as captured by liquidity correlations, rather 
than the R2 measure. Corr_espread is defined as the month t correlation of stock i’s daily effective 
spreads with the average daily market effective spread. Corr_illiq is the correlation of stock i’s daily 
Amihud illiquidity measure with average market illiquidity. These measures complement R2 since they 
can capture the direction of commonality. Panel C reveals that the correlation between stock liquidity 
and average market liquidity is positive – even the 25th percentile of liquidity correlations is positive 
under each market condition. Importantly, the patterns based on the R2 measures that we discuss 
above are very similar to the patterns that we observe using liquidity correlations. There is an increase 
in liquidity correlations for all stocks during severe downturns, and these increases are much more 
pronounced for Group 1 stocks. For instance, we observe about a 70% increase in effective spread 
correlations for Group 1 stocks, while this change is only 48% for Group 2 stocks. The same pattern 
holds when correlations are based on the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. Combined with the evidence 
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in Panel A that market liquidity falls during severe downturns, these basic descriptive statistics reveal 
that the crisis-period increases in R2 capture increased correlation as stock liquidities fall.  
Panel D of Table 1 summarizes return comovement during the different market return 
regimes. The commonality in returns patterns are very similar to what we observe when we examine 
commonality in liquidity in Panels B and C.  Panel D shows that the local sample of Group 1 stocks 
experience a 70% increase in return comovement during downturns, while that increase is only 52% 
for local Group 2 stocks. This suggests a potential role for trader leverage in stock return dynamics, 
which we will explore in extended analysis. 
Overall, the summary statistics in Table 1 reveal important variation in commonality across 
margin eligibility regimes. This motivates a formal examination of trader leverage as a potential driver 
of commonality.  
We use regression analysis to test formally the hypothesis that trader leverage impacts 
commonality in liquidity; however, as Lee and Lemieux (2010) suggest, it is instructive to begin with 
plots of the data near the impact cost threshold. As noted in Section 2, the impact costs that determine 
eligibility in month t are calculated over the six months prior to month t. In Figures 3a and 3b, we 
examine all stocks in the sample with impact costs between 0.25% and 1.75%. To do so, we form ten 
impact cost bins of equal width on each side of the eligibility cutoff. We choose the number of bins 
based on the F-tests suggested in Lee and Lemieux (2010).11 We compute average commonality within 
each bin. We then run separate regressions of average commonality on average impact cost for the 
                                                            
11 We fail to reject the hypothesis of over smoothing when we move to ten bins from either 20 or 30 bins. We 
reject the null of over smoothing when we move from ten bins to five. 
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observations on each side of 1%. We do this for all periods (left side Figures 3a and 3b), as well as for 
periods of severe market downturns (right side of the figures). If there is a treatment effect of margin 
trading eligibility, we would expect an increase in commonality at the cutoff, particularly during crisis 
periods. Consistent with this, the regression lines in Figures 3a and 3b show discontinuous drops in 
commonality measures based on espread and illiq, respectively, during severe downturns. By contrast, 
we do not observe discontinuities in the non-crisis period data. The figures provide further 
(suggestive) evidence of the role of trader leverage in driving commonality.  
 
3.4. Local Regressions: Methodology 
Using the time series and cross-sectional variation in the commonality in local Group 1 and 
Group 2 stocks, we estimate local discontinuity regressions in which we test whether traders’ leverage 
via margin trading impacts liquidity commonality. We also examine how any effects that we observe 
vary with prevailing market conditions. To do this, we first need to define the local sample of stocks. 
The objective is to choose a bandwidth that is small enough to capture the effect of the treatment 
(margin eligibility), but with a sufficiently large sample to provide statistical power. To make these 
tradeoffs, we rely on the optimal bandwidth selection techniques in Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 
(CCT, 2014). The CCT bandwidths are based on the data-dependent bandwidths designed for RDD 
applications in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (IK, 2012), but improve on them by selecting the initial 
bandwidth optimally. This results in more conservative (smaller) bandwidths than those suggested by 
IK. For the R2espread variable, the CCT bandwidth is 0.18, and for the R2illiq variable, it is 0.20. These 
bandwidths result in local samples that are between 85% and 90% smaller than the full sample of 
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Group 1 and Group 2 stocks. In robustness analysis (later in the paper), we also examine how sensitive 
our main findings are to the bandwidth choice. 
In the final step, we estimate regressions in which the dependent variable is the monthly R2 
for all stocks in the local discontinuity sample. The basic specification is as follows: 
 2 * 1 .it it itR Group       (2) 
Group 1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the stock is eligible for margin trading during month t. 
The baseline regression includes a vector of year-month fixed effects. Because the dependent variable 
is estimated, we bootstrap all standard errors.12 Our objective is to understand whether shocks 
(variations in margin eligibility) to the ability of traders to obtain leverage channel (margin financing) 
have a causal impact on liquidity comovement. The estimated coefficient on β captures the difference 
in commonality for stocks that lie just above and just below the threshold and identifies the average 
treatment effect as long as error terms (and potentially omitted variables) are continuous at the cutoff. 
The identification comes from the fact that the eligibility is discontinuous at impact cost equal to 1%, 
but variation in the other relevant variables is continuous (see, e.g., Lee and Lemieux (2010)). 
Because we are primarily interested in the question of what drives the increases in liquidity 
comovement that we observe during crises, we remove the year-month fixed effects and add an 
interaction variable that captures the impact of trader leverage during crises. Severedownturn is a dummy 
                                                            
12 We use Stata’s bssize command to determine the optimal number of replications. We require that our 
bootstrapped standard errors do not deviate from the ideal bootstrapped value (i.e., the value obtained with 
infinitely many replications) by more than 10% with probability 0.99. This results in 331 replications. 
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variable equal to 1 if monthly market returns are in the bottom decile of the monthly returns during 
our sample period. The main specification is as follows: 
 
2
1 2* 1 * 1 *
* .
it it it t
t it
R Group Group severedownturn
severedownturn
  
 
  
    (3) 
The primary coefficients of interest are on the Group 1 indicator variable and the Group 1*severedownturn 
interaction variable. If margin calls create financing frictions for margin traders, then we would expect 
Group 1 stocks to exhibit more commonality in liquidity during times in which deleveraging affects 
many stocks in the market. We also estimate a model in which we replace the direct effect of 
severedownturn in Equation (3) with month-year fixed effects. We do this to check whether any findings 
from the main specification are due to unmodeled time-series variation in commonality.  
3. Results 
4.1. Commonality in Liquidity 
The results of the local regressions are in Table 2. In Columns 1 through 3, the dependent variable is 
R2espread, and in Columns 4 through 6, it is R2illiq. In the case of R2espread, we observe a small, positive 
coefficient on the Group 1 dummy variable when we constrain the impact of trader leverage to be the 
same in all market environments (Column 1). The estimated coefficient of 0.0085 suggests that 
eligibility increases commonality by 8.5 basis points, which is 6.1% higher than the mean of 139 basis 
points for the local sample of Group 2 stocks. In Column 2, when we allow the effect of eligibility to 
vary when the overall market is in a severe downturn, the patterns are much more striking. In fact, we 
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find that the results in Column 1 are driven entirely by severe downturn periods. The estimated 
coefficient on the Group 1 dummy is insignificant. Consistent with earlier work, we find that all stocks 
exhibit more commonality during downturns. The estimated coefficient of 0.1108 on the severedownturn 
dummy suggests a 111 basis point increase in crisis-period commonality, representing 79.9% and 
75.8% increases relative to the sample averages of 139 basis points and 146 basis points for Group 1 
and Group 2 stocks, respectively. Importantly, the positive and significant coefficient of 0.052 on the 
Group1*severedownturn interaction implies that those stocks eligible for margin trading display an 
additional 52 basis points increase in commonality. These estimates imply that trader leverage accounts 
for approximately one third of the total crisis-period increase in commonality for Group 1 stocks and 
maps to a 35.3% increase in commonality relative to the Group 1 sample mean. Column 3 shows 
results from the specification in which we replace the direct effect of severedownturn with month-year 
fixed effects. The estimated coefficient on the Group1*severedownturn interaction is 0.0358 and remains 
highly significant. While we use the specification in Column 2 throughout the paper because it allows 
us to make statements about the impact of margin trading during crises relative to the average increase 
in commonality across all stocks during crisis periods, the results in Column 3 provide a useful 
specification check.  
When we examine the impact of trader leverage on R2illiq, we find patterns that are similar to 
what we find for R2espread. In Column 4 of Table 2, in which we restrict the effect of leverage on 
commonality to be the same across market conditions, we find that the estimated coefficient on Group 
1 is positive, but the t-statistic is only 1.59. When we allow the effect of margin trading eligibility to 
vary when the market is in a severe downturn (Column 5), we find that commonality in all stocks 
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substantially increases during severe downturns. More importantly, similar to the R2espread regressions, 
we find that there is an additional increase in commonality for margin-eligible stocks. Specifically, in 
the case of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio, trader leverage explains nearly 40% of the total crisis-
period increase in commonality in Group 1 stocks. Similar to Column 3, the results in Column 6 show 
that the main findings are robust to replacing the direct effect of severedownturn with month-year fixed 
effects. Overall, the evidence in Table 2 strongly supports the hypothesis that trader leverage drives 
commonality in crises.   
4.1.1. Robustness 
In Table 2, the only covariates are time fixed effects and the market conditions variable. As 
Lee and Lemieux (2010) explain, adding covariates can help reduce the sampling variability in the 
regression discontinuity estimates. Therefore, we add a vector of firm-level control variables to control 
for factors that are known to be correlated with measures of commonality in liquidity (see, e.g., 
Chordia et al. (2000), Kamara et al. (2008), Karolyi et al. (2012), and Koch et al. (2016)). The additional 
controls are lagged: volatility (defined as the standard deviation of daily stock-level returns), stock-
level returns, log rupee volume, market capitalization, and lagged dependent variable. While including 
these covariates imposes a linearity assumption, Lee and Lemieux (2010) point out that doing so does 
not affect the consistency of the RD estimator. Before estimating the regressions, we check the extent 
to which covariates exhibit discontinuities at the eligibility cutoff during severe downturns. As shown 
in Appendix Figure A.1, we do not observe discontinuous changes in these variables. 
The results of regressions with the control variables are presented in Table 3. Overall, as in 
Table 2, we find that crisis periods are associated with higher commonality and that margin trading 
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substantially increases this effect. The magnitudes of the estimated effects of margin trading during 
downturns are similar to, although slightly larger than, the baseline results from Columns 2 and 5 of 
Table 2. Not surprisingly, we also find significant relationships between commonality and the 
covariates. We find that commonality is higher when stock volatility and trading volume are higher 
and when market capitalization is smaller.13 We also find that commonality is positively autocorrelated. 
The relationship between commonality and lagged stock returns depends on the specification. When 
we control for month fixed effects, the relationship is negative and marginally significant, suggesting 
that commonality decreases when stock returns increase. When we instead explicitly control for 
extreme market downturns, the relationship between commonality and the continuous returns variable 
becomes positive, which might capture some common liquidity improvements as stock market 
conditions improve. Although they don’t really affect the estimates, to remain conservative, we keep 
the control variables in all subsequent analyses. 
Having established that the basic results are robust to the inclusion of control variables, we 
now turn to the question of bandwidth selection (i.e., defining the local “neighborhood” around the 
impact cost cutoff of 1%). As noted earlier, we rely on CCT bandwidths because of their optimality 
properties; however, it is still useful to check to see whether the results are robust to a plausible set of 
                                                            
13 One might be concerned that the margin trading effect on commonality in liquidity is really a 
contemporaneous volume effect (assuming margin trading leads to increased volume and commonality in 
volume which, in turn, might impact commonality in liquidity).  In Appendix Table A.1, we repeat the Table 2 
and Table 3 regressions, but replace the dependent variables with R2volume, the R2 from a regression of daily 
volume innovations on market volume innovations during month t.  We find no significant relationship 
between margin trading eligibility and commonality in trading volume.  This is true in both normal times, and 
in times of crisis. Moreover, in the data, we do not observe a differential impact on volume levels of Group 1 
stocks during bad times.  These finding strongly support the idea that margin trading captures trader leverage, 
distinct from volume.  
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alternative bandwidths. The CCT bandwidth for R2espread is 0.18 and it is 0.20 for R2illiq. In Appendix 
Table A.2, we increase and decrease these bandwidths in increments of 0.02 (to values that are 30% 
to 33% greater than and less than the CCT values). As can be seen from Appendix Table A.2, the 
main results are robust to bandwidth choice.  
Finally, we confirm our main findings using local polynomial regressions. We follow Lee and 
Lemieux (2010) and use the Akaike information criterion (AIC) to determine the appropriate 
polynomial orders for a given bandwidth. This approach helps avoid the overfitting problem that can 
result from estimating polynomial regressions over very narrow bandwidths. We begin with the CCT 
bandwidth used in main regressions, and we expand it by factors of 1.25 to 1.75. The AIC suggests 
polynomial orders ranging from 1 to 3 for these bandwidths. Results are reported in Appendix Table 
A.3. Results show that impact cost polynomials are not significant, and importantly, the inclusion of 
these polynomials does not have an impact on our findings. 
While it is commonly used in the literature, one potential question with the overall 
interpretation of the R2 measures is that high R2 can, in theory, capture important positive or negative 
liquidity comovement.  The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 reveal that the documented 
patterns in liquidity comovement are due to increases in positive comovement. To test formally 
whether our results are dependent on the choice of R2-based commonality measures, we repeat the 
Table 3 analysis using alternative commonality measures (Corr_espread and Corr_illiq), which measure 
the correlation between a stock’s daily liquidity with market liquidity. Results are in Table 4. The results 
in Table 4 are remarkably similar to results using R2espread and R2illiq.  For example,  the estimated 
coefficient of 0.1008 on severedownturn in the Corr_espread regression implies a 42-43% crisis-period 
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increase in commonality for all stocks and the coefficient of 0.0616 on Group1*severedownturn in Table 
4 implies an additional 26% increase in spread commonality for margin-eligible stocks during crises.  
That is, trader leverage accounts for more than one third of the total increase in commonality for 
margin-eligible stocks. These findings show that the effects we document in Tables 2 and 3 are driven 
by increases in positive liquidity comovement.  
4.1.2. Placebo tests 
Tables 2 through 4 reveal a causal effect of trader leverage on commonality in liquidity during 
crises. In particular, we observe a discontinuous increase in commonality at the margin trading 
eligibility cutoff, which lends empirical support for the hypothesis that trader leverage causes 
commonality, especially during downturns. The identifying assumption in this interpretation is that 
there is a sharp discontinuity in the ability of traders to borrow at the impact cost value of 1%. One 
potential alternative interpretation of the main results (in Tables 2 and 3) is that the measured impact 
costs predict future commonality in liquidity rather than variation in trader leverage and that the 
regressions capture this relationship. To ensure that our results are not driven by variation in impact 
cost, we repeat the analysis around false eligibility cutoffs. We examine two false cutoffs: the first at 
one bandwidth above, and the second at one bandwidth below, the true cutoff of 1%.  
The results of the placebo analysis are in Panel A of Table 5. Unlike the liquidity patterns at 
the true cutoff shown in Tables 2 through 4, we find no evidence of discontinuous jumps in 
commonality around the false eligibility thresholds. This is true both on average and during crises, and 
it lends strong support to the causal interpretation of our findings. 
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What happens during other periods of high market volatility, specifically when there are large 
rises in the market? If the main findings are due to margin traders whose portfolio constraints cause 
deleveraging when market conditions deteriorate, we would not expect to observe symmetric effects 
during extreme up- and down- market conditions. Examining market rallies, rather than severe 
downturns, can serve as a placebo check for the mechanism driving our results. In Panel B of Table 
5, we repeat the Table 3 regression analyses, but we replace severedownturn with market_rally, a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if market returns are higher than 90th percentile returns. There are two important 
observations from the table. First, on average, commonality in liquidity is lower during extreme market 
increases. Second and most importantly, there is no differential impact of margin eligibility on 
commonality during market rallies, that is, the coefficient on the market_rally*Group 1 interaction is 
statistically insignificant. These findings support the leverage-induced funding constraints 
interpretation of our main results.  
4.1.3. Alternative explanations 
Karolyi, Lee and Van Dijk (2012) find that commonality is higher when stocks are owned by 
more foreign owners. Kamara, Lou, and Sadka (2008) find that institutional ownership and index 
membership are associated with higher commonality. Unlike the trader leverage channel (an effect 
related to funding constraints), these variables capture effects due to similarity in institutional 
investment styles or tastes. In interpreting the results in this paper, one might be concerned that Group 
1 status is capturing variation in institutional (or foreign) ownership rather than trader leverage. In this 
section, we analyze this, as well as other potential alternative explanations. 
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  It is useful to start by noting that our main finding arises only during severe downturns.  We 
do not observe significant differences in commonality in liquidity between Groups 1 and 2 stocks 
outside of downturns. Alternative explanations based on correlated trading channels are unlikely to 
drive the main results because, if margin traders engage in correlated trading strategies due to similarity 
in investment style or taste, we would expect margin eligibility to drive correlations in liquidity during 
normal market conditions and stock market rallies, as well as downturns. To complement this 
reasoning, we conduct extended robustness tests to assess directly the impact of previously 
documented channels on our findings.  
To examine whether our results are driven by index membership, we introduce a dummy equal 
to 1 if the stock is in the CNX500 index (Standard and Poor’s broad-based index of the Indian Stock 
market). To investigate the role of investor type, we use quarterly ownership data from Prowess and 
introduce variables foreign and inst, which are equal to percentage foreign and institutional ownership, 
respectively.  We repeat the analysis shown in Table 3, but we include all of these direct effects. We 
also interact them with Group 1 dummy, as well as the Group 1*severedownturn interaction variable, to 
see whether our trader leverage interpretation is actually coming from an alternative mechanism. In 
addition, we examine whether Group 1 status is proxying for the ability to trade derivatives on the 
stock. To do so, we introduce deriv, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the stock is eligible for futures and 
options trading.14 
                                                            
14 Note that all stocks eligible for futures and options trading are in Group 1; however, it is only a subset of 
margin-eligible stocks (there are approximately 150 of these stocks). This means that the group1*deriv and deriv 
are collinear. Thus, the former are dropped from the analysis. 
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Results are in Table 6. The estimated coefficients on the direct effects are overall in line with 
earlier findings. For instance, consistent with Kamara, Lou, and Sadka (2008), we find that, on average, 
index stocks exhibit more commonality and institutional ownership exacerbates commonality in 
liquidity. Similar to Karolyi, Lee and Van Dijk (2012), we also find higher commonality in stocks with 
more foreign ownership. Interestingly, the estimated coefficients on the Group 1 interactions with 
foreign ownership and index membership are both negative, suggesting that margin eligibility mitigates 
their effects. While these alternative interpretations are significant on average, they don’t have a 
differential impact on commonality in liquidity during severe downturns. Most importantly, the 
estimated crisis-period impact of Group 1 status on commonality in liquidity remains very close to the 
main results in Table 3, even after accounting for these alternative channels.  
Finally, using the quarterly ownership data from Prowess, we check for changes in ownership 
composition during severe downturns. For each stock, we calculate the percentage shares held by 
foreign investors, institutional investors, individual investors, and blockholders/insiders (foreign perc, 
inst perc, indiv perc, and promoter perc, respectively). We also investigate whether the information structure 
of trading, which might cause changes in commonality, changes during severe downturn periods.15 We 
then regress these stockholdings on the Group 1 dummy as well as its interaction with severedownturn. 
Appendix Table A.4 reports the results. Group 1*severedownturn is insignificant in all regressions, 
                                                            
15 To do this, we introduce the Probability of Informed Trading (PIN, based on Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and 
Paperman, (1996)). 
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indicating that there is no significant change in ownership composition or informed trading during 
severe downturns. 16   
 
4.2. Return Commonality 
The analysis thus far tests the hypothesis that leverage can drive substantial increases in 
liquidity comovement during crises.  We focus most of the initial analysis on commonality in liquidity 
because it is pervasive and not well-understood; however, it is important to point out that, in theory 
(e.g., Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Geanakoplos (2010)), trader 
leverage will drive both commonality in liquidity and commonality in returns. In this section, we use 
our research design to test the hypothesis that trader leverage causes return comovement. Our set-up 
allows us to estimate the portion of return comovement that stems from frictions related to trader 
leverage. 
Before describing the specifics of the empirical analysis, it is important to emphasize that 
commonality in liquidity does not necessarily imply commonality in returns. As Karolyi, Lee and Van 
Dijk (2012) note, commonality in liquidity can arise when stocks are facing very different liquidity 
demands. If one group of stocks experiences intense buying pressure, while the other experiences 
intense selling pressure, we would see increased correlation in liquidity but not an increase in return 
correlation. However, in the case of the deleveraging that occur during crises, selling pressure that are 
                                                            
16 As the results in Appendix Table A.4 indicate that investor composition does not change with Group 1 
membership, we populate the quarterly ownership data at the monthly frequency for the purpose of Table 6. 
This allows us to compare the results with the ones from the baseline analysis.  
32 
 
likely to be similar across stocks might cause returns to comove in ways that are similar to the liquidity 
patterns that we observe.  
To test for evidence of the hypothesized relationship between leverage and returns 
comovement, we repeat the main Table 2 and Table 3 regressions, but we replace the dependent 
variable with commonality in returns. Similar to before, we use the R2 from a regression of stock i’s 
returns on the market index to capture return commonality. The results are in Table 7. Columns 1 and 
2 are analogous to the Table 2 regressions. They show results of regressions without the stock-level 
control variables. In Columns 3 and 4, we add the same additional controls that we include in Table 
3. Consistent with the descriptive statistics in Panel D of Table 1, the estimates in Table 7 provide 
causal evidence of the impact of trader leverage on return comovement during severe downturns. 
Columns 1 and 3 show that, on average, there is a significant difference in return comovement 
between Group 1 and Group 2 stocks, however this difference is quite small.  For example, in Column 
1, the estimated coefficient on Group1 dummy implies a 10 basis point increase in return comovement 
for stocks that are eligible for margin trading, which is a 3.9% increase relative to the average return 
comovement in the local sample of Group 2 stocks. When we include severedownturn dummy as well as 
its interaction with Group1 dummy variable in Columns 2 and 4, we see that this difference is entirely 
driven by crisis periods (as in the case of commonality in liquidity).   The coefficient of 0.056 on the 
Group 1*severedownturn interaction in Column 2 of Table 7 implies that trader leverage accounts for a 
56 basis point increase in crisis-period return comovement. This represents approximately 28% of the 
total crisis-period increase in return comovement, which is remarkably similar in magnitude to the 
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results we document for commonality in liquidity. Overall, these findings show that leverage is a key 
driver of the increase in stock return comovement that we observe during downturns. 17   
Given the results in Tables 2, 3 and 7, and the theoretical linkages between commonality in 
returns and liquidity, it is natural to ask whether the Group 1 stocks with higher return commonality 
during downturns also have higher liquidity commonality. The data reveal that this is, indeed, the case.  
While the correlation between commonality in liquidity and commonality in returns measures for local 
Group 1 stocks is only 0.2 outside severe downturns, this correlation more than doubles during severe 
downturns. In Panel B of Table 7, we further examine this by looking at stocks’ liquidity and return 
comovement rankings. In each period, we independently sort Group 1 stocks into 5 groups (in 
ascending order) based on stock’s commonality in liquidity and commonality in returns. Panel B 
reports the mean commonality in returns rank for each of the 5 groups of stocks ranked on 
commonality in liquidity.18 Outside of severe downturns, there is only a mild association between 
commonality in liquidity and commonality in returns; however, the relationship becomes much 
stronger during severe downturns. Stocks that have the highest and the lowest commonality in liquidity 
during severe downturns have an average rank of 4.38 and 2.04, respectively, in R2returns. The crisis-
period increase in average R2returns ranks is also strongly monotonic as we move from stocks with the 
lowest-ranked commonality in liquidity to the ones with the highest rank.  
  
                                                            
17 Appendix Table A.5 contains results of robustness analyses in which we test whether the commonality in 
returns findings in Table 7 are sensitive to bandwidth choice or to the inclusion of polynomials of impact cost 
– the RDD checklist robustness tests.  These regressions are analogous to those in Appendix Tables A.2 and 
A.3.  As in Tables A.2 and A.3, we find that return commonality results are robust. 
18 For this exercise, we use R2espread as our measure of commonality in liquidity. Results are similar when 
conduct analyses based on the other measures of commonality that we use in this paper.  
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4.3. Mechanism 
In this section, we examine margin trading activity and leveraged-based linkages across stocks to shed 
additional light on the mechanisms driving our main findings.  All of the tests include examinations 
of commonality in both liquidity and returns. This helps us understand whether commonality in 
liquidity is caused by some of the same forces that drive commonality in returns.    
 
4.3.1. Correlated Margin Trading Activity 
The results presented so far show that the ability of traders to borrow increases commonality 
in liquidity and returns. If traders’ use of leverage (rather than simply the ability to lever up, captured 
by the Group 1 dummy variable) is really driving the results, we would also expect the findings to be 
strongest in stocks in which there is more correlated margin trading activity.  We do not have trade-
level data on margin trading activity; however, the daily stock-level margin positions data available in 
India allow us to examine this question (and are a substantial improvement over the monthly market 
aggregate data available in the U.S.). We use this information to calculate a proxy for correlated margin 
trading activity: margin corr is equal to the correlation between daily changes in a Group 1 stock’s 
outstanding margin positions and the average daily changes in outstanding margin positions in the 
entire market during each month. Even though we do not observe intraday margin trades, our proxy 
is likely to be correlated with total margin trading activity.19 
                                                            
19 margin corr  captures daily correlations in changes in outstanding margin positions and is defined over the 
entire sample period.  As reported in Section 3, there is a substantial decline in margin debt for Group 1 stocks 
during severe downturns, indicating that margin corr in such time periods mostly captures correlated 
deleveraging.   
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We repeat the Table 3 and Table 7 regressions, but we include margin corr, and interact it with 
Group1 and Group1* Sevredownturn.20 If the increase in commonality in liquidity and returns that we 
observe is due to trader leverage, we expect that the coefficients on the triple interaction term will be 
positive and significant.  
The findings in Table 8 show that this is indeed the case. Results reveal an economically 
important role for margin corr for both commonality in liquidity and commonality in returns.  For 
instance, the results in Column 1 imply that a one standard deviation increase in correlated margin 
activity during severe downturns results in a 0.035 (equal to 0.15 * 0.23) increase in R2espread, which is 
about 50% of the average effect of the increase in R2espread during severe downturns. Note that, unlike 
the triple interaction term, coefficients on margin corr*Group1 are not positive and significant, revealing 
that trader leverage does not increase commonality outside the crises periods. The findings for 
commonality in liquidity based on R2illiq and commonality in returns are similar (Columns 2 and 3 of 
Table 8, respectively).   
 
4.3.2. Within-Group Commonality  
If the increased commonality of liquidity and returns that we observe in Group 1 stocks during 
severe downturns is due to binding capital constraints and deleveraging, then one would expect 
commonality to be higher within the universe of Group 1 stocks. In this section, we analyze 
commonality within and across Group 1 and Group 2 stocks. To do so, we calculate the pairwise 
                                                            
20 Since margin corr is available only for Group 1 stocks (it is set to zero for Group 2 stocks), regressions include 
only Group1* Severedownturn. The interaction severedownturn * margin corr and margin corr are dropped due to 
multicollinearity.  
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correlations in stocks’ liquidity and return measures, and then we test whether within- or across-group 
commonality is stronger. 
For each local stock, we calculate the monthly pairwise correlations of the stock’s daily liquidity 
with the daily stock liquidity of all other stocks in the market (including nonlocal stocks).  We also do 
the same for returns.  Corr_espread is the monthly pairwise correlation in espread. Corr_illiq is the monthly 
pairwise correlation in illiq.  Corr_return is the monthly pairwise correlation in stock returns.  We analyze 
the differences in pairwise correlations for different types of stock pairs. G1G1 is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if both stocks in a given pair are Group 1 members; G2G2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if both stocks in a given pair are Group 2 members. The baseline pair is a pair that consists of one 
Group 1 and one Group 2 stock. We interact both G1G1 and G2G2 with severedownturn dummy to 
assess the change in within-group pairwise correlations during downturns. The results are in Table 9. 
Consistent with our previous findings, all stocks exhibit commonality, especially during downturns. 
Group 1 stocks, whose margin traders are more likely to face collateral calls that may cause them to 
liquidate several stocks in their portfolios, have higher pairwise correlations with both Group 1 and 
Group 2 stocks during downturns. Most importantly, in those crisis periods, Group 1 stocks have 
higher pairwise liquidity and return correlations with other Group 1 stocks than they do with Group 
2 stocks (G1G1 and G1G1 * severedownturn are both positive and significant). Thus, the findings in 
Tables 2, 3 and 7 not only reflect Group 1 stocks’ increased comovement with the market, but that 
some of this stems from increased comovement with other Group 1 stocks.  Group 2 stocks, which 
are ineligible for margin trading and less likely to have traders facing margin calls, see less pairwise 
liquidity and return comovement with other Group 2 stocks in both normal times and during crises. 
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4.3.3. Connected Through Margin Trading  
We obtain trader-level margin positions data from the NSE for the 2007 to 2010 subperiod to 
dive deeper into the idea that common margin traders in Group 1 stocks play an important role in 
crisis-period commonality. These data are much richer than the monthly market-level margin debt 
outstanding data available from U.S. exchanges like the NYSE and allow us to conduct more 
meaningful analyses of the impact of connections that stocks have via levered traders and their 
brokers.21 For each stock and each trading day, we observe all traders’ individual end-of-day margin 
trading positions, along with unique trader and broker identification numbers. The identification 
numbers allow us to identify all of the stocks financed with margin debt by each individual trader, as 
well as the broker that she uses.22 Both the trader and broker connections are of interest. At the trader 
level, it is possible that a margin call will force a given trader to liquidate positions in many stocks in 
her portfolio at once. At the broker level, a negative shock to the overall market might make the 
broker less willing and able to provide capital to its customers. Both are related to funding constraints, 
stemming from stress at the trader- and broker-level, respectively. 
We start with a few facts about common margin traders and their brokers. There are 85,920 
unique margin traders in the sample. These margin traders obtain margin debt from 19 brokers during 
                                                            
21 Bian, Da, Lou, and Zhou (2016) also use trader-level data for margin investors, but they focus on China.  
They use their data to understand the effect of margin trading and common margin traders on stock returns.  
Their paper complements ours in that they find evidence that margin investors tend to delever if stocks in their 
portfolios have done poorly and that this response is strongest during market downturns. Unlike our paper’s 
focus, they neither examine commonality in liquidity nor do they exploit a natural experiment to identify causal 
linkages.   
22 Chung and Kang (2016) also examine the role of prime brokers in generating commonalities; however, their 
main goal is to analyze brokers’ impact on comovement in hedge fund returns. 
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the sample period.23 There is a high degree of concentration among these providers of margin debt, 
with just two to three dominant players in each year. The Herfindahl-Hershman index, based on the 
average daily rupee value of margin loans, ranges from 2,957 in 2008 to 3,486 in 2010. The median 
local stock with margin debt outstanding on a given day is connected to 86 other stocks through 
common margin traders, with an interquartile range of 27 to 140 connected stocks. Not surprisingly, 
since a single broker is likely to serve more than one client, there are even more connections at the 
broker level. The median local stock with margin debt outstanding is connected to 415 other stocks 
through common brokers, with an interquartile range of 340 to 473. Thus, cross-stock connections 
through margin trading are common.  
Using the detailed margin position data, we examine the role of stock-level connectedness 
through margin trading on commonality in liquidity and returns. We construct our measures of stock-
level connectedness in the spirit of Anton and Polk (2014) and Bartram, Griffin, Lim, and Ng (2015). 
We define Common traders, which is the total value of the margin trading positions held by all common 
margin traders of the two stocks scaled by the total market capitalization of the two stocks. Similarly, 
Common broker is defined as the total value of the margin trading positions lent out by all common 
brokers of the two stocks scaled by the total market capitalization of the two stocks. These measures 
are defined for pairs of stocks which are both Group1 members (this is because only Group 1 stocks 
are eligible for margin trading). Specifically, measures capture pairwise connections between the local 
Group1 stocks and all the other Group 1 stocks in the market. Both Common traders and Common broker 
                                                            
23 For each broker, all of which are members of the NSE, there may be many sub-brokers. Sub-brokers are 
not trading members of the NSE, but they act as agents for the brokers. We are only able to observe broker-
level data. 
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are monthly averages of daily values and are normalized to have zero mean and unit standard deviation 
so that it is straightforward to compare their coefficients. As in the previous analysis, dependent 
variables are monthly pairwise correlations in stocks’ liquidity and return measures, Corr_espread, 
Corr_illiq and Corr_return.  
Results are reported in Table 10. In Columns 1 through 3, we regress pairwise liquidity and 
return correlations on Common traders, the severedownturn dummy, and the Common traders*severedownturn 
interaction. In Columns 4 through 6, we regress pairwise correlations on Common broker, severedownturn, 
and their interaction. The patterns are striking. Both Common traders and Common broker are associated 
with higher liquidity and return correlations on average, and these effects become much larger during 
severe market downturns. Interestingly, the magnitudes of the coefficients on the Common broker 
variable during these periods are about twice those of Common traders. This suggests that brokers’ 
funding constraints (impacting, for example, their provision of margin debt) during downturns matter 
more than the collateral calls faced by individual traders. This finding contributes to the recent 
discussions on whether funding constraints arising on the borrower's or the lender's side are more 
important (e.g., see Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2012) for a review). Understanding this question is 
important because it can help regulators develop the appropriate policy tools. Our findings show that 
policies that aim to recapitalize or subsidize lenders can be more successful in mitigating the negative 
effects of liquidity crises.  
The main finding in this paper is that commonality in liquidity increases substantially during 
crisis periods for margin-eligible stocks.  The same is also true for returns.  Tables 8 through 10 are 
not only consistent with the idea that deleveraging during downturns causes the declines in liquidity 
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and returns for margin-eligible stocks, but also that common margin traders and brokers serve as an 
important channel through which spillovers can occur. It is worthwhile to discuss external validity and 
the extent to which these results can generalize outside of the Indian market setting. While difficult to 
fully rule out these concerns, we do not believe that they should be central to the overall interpretation. 
This is because our finding that margin-eligible stocks experience substantial increases in commonality 
during severe downturns is consistent with the same underlying mechanisms that are relevant to 
developed markets. In particular, large price declines increase traders’ leverage and tighten their 
constraints, which can lead to deleveraging and liquidity declines in all of the stocks in which traders 
tend to use leverage. This mechanism is at work in both developed and developing markets. 
4. Conclusion 
It is well-known that both U.S. and global stocks exhibit significant liquidity commonality (e.g., 
Chordia et al. (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), Karolyi, Lee, and Van Dijk (2012)). Although 
commonality in liquidity is pervasive, we still do not have a full understanding of what drives it.   In 
this paper, we exploit the features of the margin trading system in India to test whether there is a 
causal effect of trader leverage on commonality in liquidity. Consistent with the funding liquidity 
mechanism proposed by theoretical studies such as Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), we find that, 
while leverage does not have an impact during normal times, it substantially increases commonality in 
liquidity during crises period. Trader leverage has a similar impact on return comovement.  
Our analysis provides the most direct test (to our knowledge) of the hypothesis that declines in 
the collateral values of levered traders can cause commonality in both liquidity and stock returns. The 
regulatory setting helps us identify the stocks in which crisis-period trading is most likely to induce 
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deleveraging, and importantly, the regression discontinuity design allows us isolate the impact of 
develeraging from confounding effects – an empirical challenge that has been faced by previous 
studies.  Our findings should help policy-makers and researchers who are interested in identifying 
effective tools to help prevent the peaks in comovement in liquidity and stock returns that we observe 
during periods of extreme market stress. 
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Figure 1: Time Series of Commonality and Market Returns 
The figures show the time series of the equal-weighted average commonality of all Group 1 and 
Group 2 National Stock Exchange (NSE) stocks during April 2004– December 2012. Commonality 
is captured by the R2 of regressions of stock level liquidity innovations on market liquidity 
innovations. The figure also shows the Indian stock market returns. In Figure 1a, commonality in 
liquidity is based on commonality in effective spreads. In Figure 1b, it is based on the Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity ratio. Indian stock market returns are defined as the CNX 500 returns, which is 
Standard and Poor’s broad-based index of the Indian stock market. 
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Figure 2: Time Series of Commonality in the Local Sample of Group 1 and Group 2 Stocks 
The figures show the time series of the equal-weighted average commonality in the local samples of 
Group 1 and Group 2 stocks during April 2004– December 2012. Group 1 stocks are eligible for 
margin trading and Group 2 stocks are ineligible. Commonality is captured by the R2 of regressions 
of stock level liquidity innovations on market liquidity innovations. In Figure 2a, commonality in 
liquidity is based on commonality in effective spreads. In Figure 2b, it is based on the Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity ratio. Indian stock market returns are defined as the CNX 500 returns, which is 
Standard and Poor’s broad-based index of the Indian stock market. The local samples are defined 
based on CCT bandwidths, which are 0.18% and 0.20% for R2espread and R2illiq, respectively. 
Figure 2a 
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Figure 3a: Impact Cost and Commonality (R2espread)  
The figure plots the average R2espread during month t as a function of impact cost over the previous 
six months (which determines month t eligibility). R2espread is the R2 from a regression of daily stock 
level effective spread innovations on market innovations in effective spread. Stocks are divided into 
ten equally sized bins (the X axis) on each side of the eligibility cutoff of 1%. The figure shows the 
average R2espread within each bin. The number of bins is chosen based on the F-test procedures 
described in Lee and Lemieux (2010). Margin eligible stocks are all those stocks with impact costs 
that are less than or equal to 1%, which correspond to bins 1 through 10, and are located to the left 
of the vertical line. Stocks in bins 11–20 are ineligible for margin trading during period t and are 
located to the right of the vertical dotted line. “Severe downturns” refers to months in which market 
returns are below the 10th decile returns. 
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Figure 3b: Impact Cost and Commonality (R2illiq)  
The figure plots the average R2illiq during month t as a function of impact cost over the previous six 
months (which determines month t eligibility). R2illiq is the R2 from a regression of daily stock level 
innovations in the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure on market innovations. Stocks are divided into 
ten equally sized bins (the X axis) on each side of the eligibility cutoff of 1%. The number of bins is 
chosen based on the F-test procedures described in Lee and Lemieux (2010). The figure shows the 
average R2illiq within each bin. The number of bins is chosen based on the F-test procedures 
described in Lee and Lemieux (2010). Margin eligible stocks are all those stocks with impact costs 
that are less than or equal to 1%, which correspond to bins 1 through 10, and are located to the left 
of the vertical line. Stocks in bins 11–20 are ineligible for margin trading during period t and are 
located to the right of the vertical dotted line. “Severe downturns” refers to months in which market 
returns are below the 10th decile returns. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
This table provides summary statistics of market liquidity and stock returns, as well as stock-level 
commonality in liquidity and stock returns.  The sample period is from April 2004 through 
December 2012. Summary statistics are reported for the full sample, and for the subsample periods 
defined according to market conditions. “Severe downturns” refers to months in which market 
returns (i.e., CNX 500 returns) are below the 10th decile returns. “Outside of downturns” refers to all 
months outside of severe downturns. Panel A provides summary statistics for market returns and 
aggregate market liquidity levels, defined as the equal-weighted average effective spread or Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity ratio of all Group 1 and Group 2 stocks (Mkt ret, Mkt epread and Mkt illiq, 
respectively). Panels B, C and D provide summary statistics of commonality in liquidity and returns 
for the local samples of Group 1 and Group 2 stocks, where the local samples are defined based on 
CCT bandwidths. In Panel B, commonality in liquidity is measured with R2. R2espread is the R2 from 
a regression of daily stock level effective spread innovations on market effective spread innovations 
during month t. R2illiq is the R2 from a regression of daily innovations in the Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity measure on market innovations during month t. CCT bandwidths for R2espread and R2illiq 
are 0.18% and 0.20%, respectively. Panel C shows descriptive statistics of commonality in liquidity 
measured with liquidity correlations, Corr_espread and Corr_illiq. These measures are defined as the 
month t correlation of stock i’s daily effective spreads and Amihud illiquidity, respectively, with 
average market liquidity. CCT bandwidths for Corr_espread and Corr_Illiq are 0.18% and 0.17%, 
respectively. Panel D shows descriptive statistics for commonality in returns. R2returns is the R2 from 
a regression of daily stock returns on market (CNX 500) returns during month t. CCT bandwidth 
for the commonality in returns measure is 0.16%. All variables are monthly. 
 
Panel A: Market Returns and Market Liquidity Levels 
Variable Mean Median P25 P75 Std Dev 
Full sample Mkt ret 0.0145 0.0166 -0.0287 0.0679 0.0830
Mkt espread 0.7441 0.6877 0.4943 0.8637 0.3142
 Mkt illiq 3.5260 2.9380 1.6510 5.0657 2.2404 
Severe downturns Mrkt ret -0.1515 -0.1317 -0.1878 -0.1045 0.0572
Mkt espread 1.0577 1.0097 0.7170 1.0655 0.4125
 Mkt illiq 4.6150 4.8068 2.3752 6.0916 2.5092 
Outside of downturns Mrkt ret 0.0322 0.0290 -0.0123 0.0737 0.0636
 Mkt espread 0.7107 0.6617 0.4776 0.8499 0.2849
 Mkt illiq 3.4101 2.6809 1.6276 4.8626 2.1928 
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Panel B: Commonality in Liquidity – R2 
Group 1 Variable Mean Median P25 P75 Std Dev 
Full sample R2espread 0.1462 0.0807 0.0200 0.2059 0.1757
R2illiq 0.1392 0.0797 0.0181 0.2064 0.1589
Severe downturns R2espread 0.2935 0.1877 0.0609 0.4983 0.2802
R2illiq 0.2096 0.1619 0.0522 0.3157 0.1980
Outside of downturns R2espread 0.1311 0.0751 0.0182 0.1901 0.1534
 R2illiq 0.1313 0.0739 0.0168 0.1933 0.1519
       
Group 2 Variable Mean Median P25 P75 Std Dev 
Full sample R2espread 0.1388 0.0772 0.0171 0.2029 0.1628
 R2illiq 0.1355 0.0781 0.0197 0.1956 0.1560
Severe downturns R2espread 0.2392 0.1383 0.0296 0.3581 0.2618
 R2illiq 0.1782 0.1166 0.0326 0.2871 0.1784
Outside of downturns R2espread 0.1284 0.0735 0.0162 0.1940 0.1450
 R2illiq 0.1307 0.0747 0.0189 0.1871 0.1525
 
Panel C: Commonality in Liquidity – Corr 
Group 1 Variable Mean Median P25 P75 Std Dev 
Full sample Corr espread 0.2558 0.2639 0.0659 0.4473 0.2842
Corr illiq 0.2459 0.2597 0.0520 0.4490 0.2808
Severe downturns Corr espread 0.4224 0.4256 0.2106 0.7015 0.3397
Corr illiq 0.3711 0.3979 0.1959 0.5670 0.2727
Outside of downturns Corr espread 0.2387 0.2502 0.0576 0.4299 0.2723
 Corr  illiq 0.2322 0.2469 0.0385 0.4355 0.2783
       
Group 2 Variable Mean Median P25 P75 Std Dev 
Full sample Corr espread 0.2453 0.2536 0.0506 0.4456 0.2804
 Corr  illiq 0.2374 0.2512 0.0500 0.4335 0.2802
Severe downturns Corr espread 0.3641 0.3428 0.1290 0.5915 0.3271
 Corr  illiq 0.3185 0.3392 0.1361 0.5406 0.2806
Outside of downturns Corr espread 0.2330 0.2447 0.0432 0.4314 0.2723
 Corr  illiq 0.2283 0.2403 0.0439 0.4211 0.2787
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Panel D: Commonality in Returns 
Group 1 Variable Mean Median P25 P75 Std Dev 
Full sample R2returns 0.2622 0.2205 0.0807 0.4030 0.2093
Severe downturns R2returns 0.4422 0.4613 0.2729 0.6155 0.2288
Outside of downturns R2returns 0.2424 0.2033 0.0726 0.3726 0.1973
      
Group 2 Variable      Mean Median P25 P75 Std Dev 
Full sample R2returns 0.2519 0.2133 0.0818 0.3819 0.2017
Severe downturns R2returns 0.3822 0.3737 0.1865 0.5694 0.2369
Outside of downturns R2returns 0.2379 0.2005 0.0758 0.3638 0.1924 
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Table 2: Does Trader Leverage Impact Commonality in Liquidity? 
This table presents the baseline results of the analysis of the impact of margin trading eligibility on commonality in liquidity. The dependent 
variables are the average R2espread and the average R2illiq during month t, where eligibility is effective as of the beginning of month t. 
R2espread is the R2 from a regression of daily effective spread innovations on market effective spread innovations during month t. R2illiq is 
the R2 from a regression of daily innovations in the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure on market innovations during month t. The sample 
includes all stocks in Groups 1 and 2 with impact costs close to the cutoff of 1% (based on CCT bandwidths of 0.18% for the R2espread 
regressions and 0.20% for R2illiq). The explanatory variables are Group 1, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the stock is eligible for margin 
trading during month t, and a vector of year-month dummies. In Columns (2) and (4), we replace the month-year fixed effects with 
severedownturn, a dummy variable equal to 1 if market returns during month t are in the lowest decile in our sample (less than -9%), and we 
also interact the Group 1 dummy with severedownturn. Columns (3) and (6) are identical to Columns (2) and (4), but we replace the direct 
effect of severedownturn with month-year fixed effects. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% 
level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES R2espread R2espread R2espread R2illiq R2illiq R2illiq 
       
Group 1 0.0085** 0.0027 0.0051 0.0051* 0.0006 0.0025 
 (0.0034) (0.0039) (0.0036) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0032) 
Group 1*severedownturn  0.0516** 0.0358**  0.0307** 0.0250** 
  (0.0217) (0.0162)  (0.0124) (0.0119) 
severedownturn  0.1108***   0.0475***  
  (0.0158)   (0.0088)  
Constant 0.6216*** 0.1284*** 0.6054*** 0.3104*** 0.1307*** 0.2990*** 
 (0.0562) (0.0029) (0.0547) (0.0233) (0.0024) (0.0247) 
       
Observations 7,291 7,291 7,291 9,609 9,609 9,609 
R-squared 0.263 0.060 0.264 0.126 0.017 0.127 
Month-Year FE Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
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Table 3: Extended Regressions 
This table presents results of the analysis of the impact of margin trading eligibility on commonality in 
liquidity. As in Table 2, the dependent variables are the average R2espread and the average R2illiq during month 
t, where eligibility is effective as of the beginning of month t. The sample includes all stocks in Groups 1 and 
2 with impact costs close to the cutoff of 1% (based on CCT bandwidths of 0.18% for the R2espread 
regressions and 0.20% for R2illiq). The explanatory variables are Group 1, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
stock is eligible for margin trading during month t; severedownturn, a dummy variable equal to 1 if market 
returns during month t are in the lowest decile in our sample; and a vector of control variables. The control 
variables include one-month lagged: standard deviation of stock returns (std_ret), stock returns (mret), rupee 
volume (logvolume), equity market capitalization (logmcap), and the lagged dependent variables. Std_ret is the 
standard deviation of daily returns during the month. Mret is the month t stock return, calculated from the 
closing prices at the ends of months t-1 and t. Logvolume is the natural log of the daily closing price (in rupees) 
times the number of shares traded. Logmcap is the equity market capitalization, defined as the end of month t 
closing price, times shares outstanding. We also include lag_depvar, the one-month lagged dependent variable. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes 
significance at the 5% level; and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES R2espread R2illiq 
Group1 -0.0007 0.0008 
 (0.0041) (0.0036) 
Group 1*severedownturn 0.0543*** 0.0350** 
 (0.0207) (0.0148) 
Severedownturn 0.0824*** 0.0390*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0110) 
Lag std_dret 0.4098* 0.7540*** 
 (0.2237) (0.2003) 
Lag mret 0.0319** 0.0190 
 (0.0159) (0.0120) 
Lag logvolume 0.0170*** 0.0144*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0021) 
Lag logmcap -0.0130*** -0.0199*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0018) 
Lag depvar 0.0526*** 0.0595*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0125) 
Constant 0.1407*** 0.3212*** 
 (0.0512) (0.0396) 
Observations 5,859 7,533 
R-squared 0.069 0.055 
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Table 4: Alternative Commonality Measure (Average Liquidity Correlations) 
This table presents results of the analysis of the impact of margin trading eligibility on alternative 
commonality in liquidity measures, Corr_espread and Corr_illiq. These measures are defined as the month t 
correlation of stock i’s daily effective spreads and Amihud illiquidity ratio, respectively, with average market 
liquidity. The regressions include local stocks of Groups 1 and 2 with impact costs close to the cutoff of 1% 
(based on CCT bandwidths of 0.18% for the Corr_espread regressions and 0.17% for Corr_illiq). The 
explanatory variables and specification are identical to Table 3. Bootstrapped standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and * denotes 
significance at the 10% level. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Corr_espread Corr_illiq 
Group1 0.0042 0.0018 
 (0.0072) (0.0074) 
Group 1*severedownturn 0.0616** 0.0486** 
 (0.0296) (0.0229) 
Severedownturn 0.1008*** 0.0727*** 
 (0.0231) (0.0185) 
Lag std_dret 1.6903*** 1.3309*** 
 (0.3808) (0.3886) 
Lag mret 0.0219 -0.0016 
 (0.0236) (0.0213) 
Lag logvolume 0.0184*** 0.0259*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0037) 
Lag logmcap -0.0228*** -0.0410*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0036) 
Lag depvar 0.0773*** 0.0773*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0127) 
Constant 0.3909*** 0.6902*** 
 (0.0891) (0.0758) 
Observations 5,859 6,333 
R-squared 0.051 0.061 
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Table 5: Are Results Driven by Variation in Impact Cost? Placebo Tests 
This table presents results of placebo tests in which we repeat the analyses of the impact of margin 
trading eligibility on commonality in liquidity from Table 3. In Panel A, instead of measuring 
eligibility at the impact cost cutoff of 1.0%, we replicate the analysis around placebo cutoffs set at 
one bandwidth below and above the actual cutoff. The “Local Sample” used in the analyses consists 
of those stocks that lie close to the placebo cutoff using the same bandwidth sizes as in Tables 2 
through 4 (0.18% for R2espread and 0.20% for R2illiq). The explanatory variables are the Placebo Group 
1 dummy and the same vector of control variables defined in Table 3. Panel B presents results of the 
analysis of the impact of margin trading eligibility on commonality in liquidity and is identical to 
Table 3 except that severedownturn is replaced with market_rally, a dummy variable equal to 1 in 
months in which market returns are higher than 90th percentile returns. Bootstrapped standard errors 
are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; 
and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
Panel A: Shifting the Margin Eligibility Cutoff    
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Placebo cutoff below Placebo cutoff above 
VARIABLES R2espread R2illiq R2espread R2illiq 
Placebo Group1 0.005 0.009** 0.002 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Placebo Group1*severedownturn 0.015 -0.010 -0.039 -0.016 
 (0.021) (0.013) (0.026) (0.016) 
Severedownturn 0.135*** 0.073*** 0.108*** 0.054*** 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.017) (0.011) 
Lag std_dret 0.715*** 0.899*** 0.515* 0.767*** 
 (0.220) (0.173) (0.297) (0.226) 
Lag mret 0.055*** -0.003 0.037** 0.039*** 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.016) (0.014) 
Lag logvolume 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Lag logmcap -0.013*** -0.023*** 0.054*** -0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.020) (0.002) 
Lag depvar 0.049*** 0.078*** 0.045*** 0.083*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) 
Constant 0.127*** 0.361*** 0.144*** 0.237*** 
 (0.046) (0.038) (0.054) (0.043) 
Observations 7,714 10,226 4,423 5,545 
R-squared 0.091 0.068 0.064 0.048 
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Panel B: Extreme Market Increases 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES R2espread R2espread R2illiq R2illiq 
     
Group1 0.0080* 0.0050 0.0029 0.0051 
 (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0037) (0.0038) 
Group 1*market_rally -0.0033 -0.0054 0.0068 -0.0056 
 (0.0112) (0.0144) (0.0085) (0.0097) 
market_rally -0.0139 -0.0040 -0.0169** -0.0138* 
 (0.0085) (0.0101) (0.0067) (0.0074) 
Lag std_dret  0.5531**  0.8651*** 
  (0.2482)  (0.1819) 
Lag mret  0.0312**  0.0186 
  (0.0154)  (0.0134) 
Lag logvolume  0.0156***  0.0134*** 
  (0.0023)  (0.0021) 
Lag logmcap  -0.0119***  -0.0189*** 
  (0.0022)  (0.0018) 
Lag depvar  0.0561***  0.0639*** 
  (0.0138)  (0.0124) 
     
Constant 0.1406*** 0.1410*** 0.1377*** 0.3179*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0537) (0.0031) (0.0436) 
     
Observations 7,291 5,859 9,609 7,533 
R-squared 0.001 0.028 0.001 0.043 
 
  
59 
 
Table 6: Alternative Channels 
This table presents results of the analyses of the relationship between commonality and liquidity and both 
index membership and ownership structure. The dependent variables are the R2espread and R2illiq during 
month t, where eligibility is effective as of the beginning of month t. The local samples and specifications are 
identical to those in Table 3 except that we add dummy variables for four alternative channels, denoted 
alt_channel in the table. The definitions for alt_channel are as follows: in Column 1, Index equals 1 if the stock is 
a member of the CNX 500; in Column 2, Foreign is the percentage foreign ownership; in Column 3, Inst is the 
percentage institutional ownership; and in Column 4, Deriv is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if futures and 
options trade on the stock. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
Panel A: R2espread 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Index 
R2espread 
Foreign 
R2espread 
Inst 
R2espread 
Deriv 
R2espread 
Group 1 0.002 0.004 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Group 1*severedownturn 0.042** 0.063** 0.062* 0.049** 
 (0.021) (0.025) (0.033) (0.023) 
Group 1*severedownturn*alt_channel 0.081 -0.055 -0.044 0.145 
 (0.061) (0.058) (0.119) (0.089) 
Group 1 *alt_channel -0.020* -0.030*** -0.000 0.037 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.025) (0.051) 
Severedownturn*alt_channel 0.000 0.023 0.033 - 
 (0.048) (0.044) (0.093)  
alt_channel 0.017* 0.020** 0.076*** 0.069* 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.024) (0.040) 
Severedownturn 0.082*** 0.077*** 0.019 0.083*** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) 
Lag std_dret 0.434* 0.370 0.373 0.251 
 (0.239) (0.239) (0.238) (0.230) 
Lag mret 0.032** 0.033** 0.035** 0.037** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Lag logvolume 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.016***
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lag logmcap -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014***
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lag depvar 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.050***
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
Constant 0.166*** 0.148*** 0.164*** 0.179***
 (0.048) (0.053) (0.056) (0.051) 
Observations 5,859 5,677 5,677 5,859 
R-squared 0.071 0.070 0.068 0.076 
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Panel B: R2illiq 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Index 
R2 illiq 
Foreign 
R2 illiq 
Inst 
R2 illiq 
Deriv 
R2 illiq 
     
Group 1 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Group 1*severedownturn 0.026* 0.036** 0.041** 0.031** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.014) 
Group 1*severedownturn*alt_channel 0.056* -0.010 -0.023 0.126* 
 (0.034) (0.029) (0.069) (0.066) 
Group 1 *alt_channel -0.008 -0.003 -0.025 -0.008 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.020) (0.028) 
Severedonwturn*alt_channel -0.009 -0.008 -0.029 - 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.052)  
alt_channel 0.007 0.004 0.044*** 0.043* 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.015) (0.023) 
Severedownturn 0.040*** 0.040*** -0.002 0.039*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.010) 
Lag std_dret 0.764*** 0.762*** 0.775*** 0.700*** 
 (0.188) (0.190) (0.190) (0.190) 
Lag mret 0.019* 0.019* 0.018 0.022* 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Lag logvolume 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lag logmcap -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.020*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lag depvar 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.060*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Constant 0.333*** 0.329*** 0.301*** 0.336*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.048) (0.044) 
Observations 7,533 7,320 7,320 7,533 
R-squared 0.056 0.055 0.056 0.057 
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Table 7: Does Trader Leverage Impact Commonality in Returns? 
Panel A presents results of the analysis of the impact of margin trading eligibility on commonality in stock 
returns. The specifications are identical to those in Tables 2 and 3 except that we replace the dependent 
variables with R2return, defined as the R2 from a regression of the daily returns of stock i on market returns 
during month t. The sample includes all stocks in Groups 1 and 2 with impact costs close to the cutoff of 1% 
(based on the CCT bandwidth of 0.16%). All explanatory variables are defined in Table 3. Bootstrapped 
standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% 
level; and * denotes significance at the 10% level. In Panel B, we independently sort stocks into 5 groups (in 
ascending order) based on the stock’s commonality in liquidity (defined as R2espread) and commonality in 
returns.  The panel reports the average rank of R2return for each group of stocks, ranked on R2espread. 
Panel A: RDD Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES R2return R2return R2return R2return 
Group1 0.010** 0.004 0.008* -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Group 1*severedownturn  0.056***  0.059*** 
  (0.018)  (0.020) 
Severedownturn  0.144***  0.118*** 
  (0.014)  (0.015) 
Lag std_dret   1.535*** 1.737*** 
   (0.323) (0.288) 
Lag mret   -0.064*** -0.045*** 
   (0.017) (0.016) 
Lag logvolume   0.010*** 0.018*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
Lag logmcap   -0.031*** -0.029*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
Lag depvar   0.181*** 0.190*** 
   (0.014) (0.014) 
Constant 0.670*** 0.238*** 0.585*** 0.501*** 
 (0.023) (0.004) (0.062) (0.058) 
     
Observations 7,635 7,635 5,954 5,954 
R-squared 0.283 0.067 0.343 0.157 
Month-Year FE Yes No Yes No 
 
Panel B. Average Ranks of Commonality in Returns for Stocks Ranked on Commonality in Liquidity 
  Ranks Based on Commonality in Liquidity 
Group 1 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
Severe downturns Rank R2returns 2.0435 2.6329 2.6923 3.4177 4.3812
Outside of downturns Rank R2returns 2.7266 2.9625 2.8518 3.1810 3.1845
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Table 8: Correlated Margin Trading Activity and Commonality in Liquidity and Returns 
This table presents results of the analysis of the relationship between correlated margin trading 
activity and commonality in liquidity. The dependent variables are R2espread, R2illiq and R2return 
during month t, where eligibility is effective as of the beginning of month t. The local samples and 
specifications are identical to Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 and Column 4 of Table 7 except that we 
introduce margin corr (defined for local Group 1 stocks), which is equal to the correlation between 
the daily changes in a stock’s outstanding margin positions and the average daily changes in 
outstanding margin positions in the entire market in each month. We also interact it with Group1 and 
Group1* severedownturn. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 
the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 (1) (2) (2) 
VARIABLES R2espread   R2illiq R2return 
    
Group1 0.0005 0.0018 0.0034 
 (0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0054) 
Group1* severedownturn 0.0618*** 0.0380** 0.0602*** 
 (0.0234) (0.0154) (0.0199) 
Group1* severedownturn * margin corr 0.1558** 0.1308*** 0.1240*** 
 (0.0650) (0.0400) (0.0412) 
Group1 * margin corr 0.0023 -0.0002 -0.0235** 
 (0.0100) (0.0089) (0.0119) 
Severedownturn 0.0824*** 0.0389*** 0.1178*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0104) (0.0140) 
Lag std_dret 0.2678 0.7290*** 1.5437*** 
 (0.2669) (0.1924) (0.2858) 
Lag mret 0.0312* 0.0204 -0.0457*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0132) (0.0163) 
Lag logvolume 0.0179*** 0.0146*** 0.0184*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0027) 
Lag logmcap -0.0123*** -0.0192*** -0.0273*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0020) (0.0028) 
Lag depvar 0.0505*** 0.0603*** 0.1974*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0122) (0.0144) 
Constant 0.1170** 0.3035*** 0.4697*** 
 (0.0564) (0.0449) (0.0631) 
    
Observations 5,403 6,941 5,476 
R-squared 0.073 0.058 0.155 
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Table 9:  Within-Group Pairwise Correlations in Stock Liquidity and Returns  
 
This table presents results of the analysis of commonality in liquidity and returns using pairwise 
correlations. For each local stock, defined as those stocks with impact costs between 0.8% and 
1.2%, we calculate the pairwise correlation of the stock’s daily liquidity with daily stock liquidity of 
all other Group 1 and Group 2 stocks in a given month.  We do the same for returns. Corr_espread is 
the monthly pairwise correlation in spread; Corr_illiq is the monthly pairwise correlation in illiq; and 
Corr_return is the monthly pairwise correlation in stock returns.  Panel A analyzes the differences in 
pairwise correlations for different types of stock pairs. G1G1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if both 
stocks in a given pair are Group 1 members; G2G2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if both stocks in a 
given pair are Group 2 members. The baseline pair is a pair that consists of one Group 1 and one 
Group 2 stock. We also interact G1G1 and G2G2 with severedownturn. Bootstrapped standard errors 
are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; 
and * denotes significance at the 10% level.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Corr_espread Corr_illiq Corr_return 
G1G1 0.0310*** 0.0171*** 0.0277*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
G1G1 * severedownturn 0.0591*** 0.0320*** 0.0254*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0011) 
Severedownturn 0.1718*** 0.0554*** 0.1579*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
G2G2 -0.0228*** -0.0144*** -0.0118*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0004) 
G2G2 * severedownturn -0.0270*** -0.0166*** -0.0161*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0014) 
Constant 0.1216*** 0.0781*** 0.1737*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Observations 2,938,397 3,110,791 3,580,995 
R-squared 0.036 0.006 0.036 
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Table 10:  Stock Connections and Pairwise Correlations in Stock Liquidity and Returns  
This table examines the relationship between pairwise correlations and stocks’ connections through margin trading. Using the trader-level 
position data, which is available for the 2007 to 2010 subperiod, we construct measures of common margin traders and common brokers. 
Common traders is the total value of the margin trading positions held by all common traders of the two stocks, scaled by the total market 
capitalization of the two stocks. Common broker is the total value of the margin trading positions lent out by all common brokers of the two 
stocks, scaled by the total market capitalization of the two stocks. Both Common traders and Common broker are normalized and interacted 
with severedownturn. Since Common traders and  Common broker can be defined for margin eligible stocks, the regressions use only local Group 1 
stocks (impact costs between 0.8 % and 1%). Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** 
denotes significance at the 5% level; and * denotes significance at the 10% level.  
 
 Common Traders Common Broker 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Corr_espread Corr_illiq Corr_return  Corr_espread Corr_illiq Corr_return 
Common traders 0.0025*** 0.0036*** 0.0029***    
 (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0006)    
Common traders* severedownturn 0.0153*** 0.0148*** 0.0165***    
 (0.0049) (0.0043) (0.0039)    
Severedownturn 0.3246*** 0.1506*** 0.2406*** 0.3172*** 0.1406*** 0.2381*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0012) 
Common broker    0.0199*** 0.0197*** 0.0191*** 
    (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Common broker * severedownturn    0.0383*** 0.0276*** 0.0339*** 
    (0.0024) (0.0017) (0.0050) 
Constant 0.1872*** 0.1114*** 0.2219*** 0.1869*** 0.1102*** 0.2239*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Observations 330,564 415,508 388,323 304,843 383,686 388,323 
R-squared 0.069 0.024 0.086 0.072 0.030 0.091 
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Internet Appendix to Systematic Liquidity and Leverage 
Figure IA.1: Impact Cost and Covariates 
The figure plots the covariates in Table 3 during month t as a function of impact cost over the previous six 
months (which determines month t eligibility). The covariates are one-month lagged: standard deviation of 
stock returns (std_ret), stock returns (mret), rupee volume (logvolume), and equity market capitalization (logmcap). 
Std_ret is the standard deviation of daily returns during the month. Mret is the month t stock return, calculated 
from the closing prices at the ends of months t-1 and t. Logvolume is the natural log of the daily closing price 
(in rupees) times the number of shares traded. Logmcap is the equity market capitalization, defined as the end 
of month t closing price, times shares outstanding. Stocks are divided into ten equally sized bins (the X axis) 
on each side of the eligibility cutoff of 1%. The figure shows the average value of the the covariate within 
each bin. The number of bins is chosen based on the F-test procedures described in Lee and Lemieux (2010). 
Margin eligible stocks are all those stocks with impact costs that are less than or equal to 1%, which 
correspond to bins 1 through 10, and are located to the left of the vertical line. Stocks in bins 11–20 are 
ineligible for margin trading during period t and are locaed to the right of the vertical dotted line. Panel A 
shows plots for the full sample period. Panel B shows plots for severe downturns (months in which market 
returns are below the 10th decile returns). 
Panel A. Full Sample 
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 Panel B. Severe Downturns 
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Figure IA.2: Impact Cost and Alternative Channels 
The figure plots the alternative channels from Table 6 as a function of impact cost over the previous six months (which determines month t eligibility). 
The alternative channels are: foreign perc, the percentage foreign ownership; inst perc, the percentage institutional ownership; promoter perc, the percentage 
promoter/insider ownership (in percent); indiv perc, the percentage ownership of individuals; index, a dummy equal to 1 if the stock is a member of the 
CNX 500; and F&0, a dummy equal to 1 if the stock is eligible for futures and options trading. Stocks are divided into ten equally sized bins (the X 
axis) on each side of the eligibility cutoff of 1%. The figure shows the average value of the alternative channel within each bin. The number of bins is 
chosen based on the F-test procedures described in Lee and Lemieux (2010). Margin eligible stocks are all those stocks with impact costs that are less 
than or equal to 1%, which correspond to bins 1 through 10, and are located to the left of the vertical line. Stocks in bins 11–20 are ineligible for margin 
trading during period t and are locaed to the right of the vertical dotted line. Panel A shows plots for the full sample period. Panel B shows plots for 
severe downturns (months in which market returns are below the 10th decile returns). 
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Panel B. Severe Downturns 
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Appendix Table A.1 Commonality in Volume 
This table presents results of the analysis of the impact of margin trading eligibility on commonality in trading volume. The regressions are identical to 
those in Tables 2 and Table 3, except that we replace the dependent variables with R2volume, the R2 from a regression of daily volume 
innovations on market volume innovations during month t.  The sample includes all stocks in Groups 1 and 2 with impact costs close to the 
cutoff of 1% (based on CCT bandwidths of 0.18%). The explanatory variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3. Bootstrapped standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 (1) (1) (2) 
VARIABLES R2volume R2volume R2volume 
Group1 -0.005** -0.006* -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Group 1*severedownturn  0.008 0.001 
  (0.010) (0.012) 
Severedownturn  0.020** 0.018* 
  (0.008) (0.010) 
Lag std_dret   1.169*** 
   (0.201) 
Lag mret   -0.000 
   (0.011) 
Lag logvolume   -0.003 
   (0.002) 
Lag logmcap   -0.003* 
   (0.002) 
Lag depvar   0.025** 
   (0.012) 
Constant 0.117*** 0.106*** 0.182*** 
 (0.014) (0.003) (0.038) 
Observations 7,635 7,635 5,954 
R-squared 0.198 0.004 0.014 
Month-Year FE Yes No No 
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Appendix Table A.2: Alternative Bandwidths 
This table presents results of the analysis of the impact of margin trading eligibility on commonality in liquidity using alternative bandwidths. The 
regression specification is identical to that in Table 3 of the main text. The dependent variables are the average R2espread and the average R2illiq during 
month t, where eligibility is effective as of the beginning of month t. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 3 in the main text. Columns (1) 
through (6) increase and decrease the CCT bandwidths by increments of 0.02. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variable = R2espread 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 +0.02     +0.04 +0.06 
Group 1 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Group 1*severedownturn 0.042* 0.049** 0.061*** 0.054** 0.045** 0.043** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) 
severedownturn 0.084*** 0.078*** 0.073*** 0.082*** 0.087*** 0.091*** 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) 
Lag std_dret 0.326 0.270 0.393* 0.410* 0.371 0.485** 
 (0.282) (0.264) (0.230) (0.231) (0.229) (0.203) 
Lag mret 0.037** 0.036** 0.034** 0.032** 0.031** 0.032** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Lag logvolume 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lag logmcap -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lag depvar 0.066*** 0.071*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.050*** 0.047*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
Constant 0.131** 0.147** 0.151*** 0.141*** 0.143*** 0.144*** 
 (0.065) (0.059) (0.052) (0.051) (0.048) (0.046) 
Observations 3,879 4,543 5,184 6,547 7,216 7,889 
R-squared 0.068 0.068 0.066 0.069 0.071 0.075 
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Panel B: Dependent Variable = R2illiq 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 +0.02     +0.04 +0.06 
Group 1 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Group 1*severedownturn 0.045** 0.036** 0.034** 0.035** 0.030** 0.028** 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) 
severedownturn 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) 
Lag std_dret 0.806*** 0.806*** 0.727*** 0.754*** 0.781*** 0.792*** 
 (0.213) (0.214) (0.196) (0.188) (0.165) (0.170) 
Lag mret 0.009 0.014 0.021* 0.019 0.012 0.018* 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) 
Lag logvolume 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lag logmcap -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.020*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lag depvar 0.068*** 0.064*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.063*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Constant 0.283*** 0.284*** 0.291*** 0.321*** 0.297*** 0.304*** 
 (0.051) (0.043) (0.046) (0.044) (0.038) (0.036) 
Observations 5,210 5,951 6,733 8,302 9,084 9,905 
R-squared 0.056 0.054 0.055 0.054 0.055 0.059 
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Appendix Table A.3: Local Polynomial Regressions 
 
This table presents results of analyses of the impact of margin trading eligibility on market liquidity 
using local polynomial regressions. Polynomial orders for each bandwidth are determined by the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC). We begin with the CCT bandwidth used in Table 2, and we 
expand it by factors of 1.25 to 1.75. Impact cost is centered around the 1% cutoff (i.e., subtract 0.01 
from Impact Cost). Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 
1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 x1.25 x1.5 x1.75 x1.25 x1.5 x1.75 
VARIABLES R2espread R2espread R2espread R2illiq R2illiq R2illiq 
Group1 0.0031 0.0043 0.0031 -0.0009 0.0057 0.0119 
 (0.0075) (0.0111) (0.0134) (0.0067) (0.0092) (0.0117) 
Group 1*severedownturn 0.0431** 0.0462** 0.0470*** 0.0297** 0.0290** 0.0219** 
 (0.0190) (0.0181) (0.0167) (0.0124) (0.0115) (0.0103) 
Severedownturn 0.0908*** 0.0949*** 0.0997*** 0.0399*** 0.0470*** 0.0479*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0124) (0.0128) (0.0089) (0.0084) (0.0083) 
Impact Cost 0.0388 0.1232 0.1072 -0.0105 0.0437 0.0576 
 (0.0453) (0.1398) (0.2997) (0.0343) (0.1094) (0.2316) 
Impact Cost*Group1 -0.0556 -0.1673 -0.1555 -0.0268 -0.0195 0.1550 
 (0.0620) (0.1733) (0.3703) (0.0426) (0.1364) (0.2751) 
Impact Cost2  -0.4064 -0.6822  -0.1415 -0.1832 
  (0.4974) (2.2550)  (0.3402) (1.5139) 
Impact Cost2*Group1  0.3660 0.4199  0.3175 1.8382 
  (0.6234) (2.8182)  (0.4408) (1.9083) 
Impact Cost3   1.5097   -0.0343 
   (4.7866)   (2.7767) 
Impact Cost3*Group1   -2.3401   3.0665 
   (5.8637)   (3.3618) 
Lag std_dret 0.4802** 0.5586*** 0.5303*** 0.8033*** 0.7015*** 0.7705*** 
 (0.2343) (0.1861) (0.1832) (0.1571) (0.1554) (0.1410) 
Lag mret 0.0322** 0.0393*** 0.0477*** 0.0182 0.0140 0.0133 
 (0.0136) (0.0125) (0.0122) (0.0115) (0.0102) (0.0097) 
Lag logvolume 0.0175*** 0.0160*** 0.0168*** 0.0148*** 0.0154*** 0.0148*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0015) 
Lag logmcap -0.0135*** -0.0136*** -0.0144*** -0.0199*** -0.0200*** -0.0202***
 (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0014) 
Lag depvar 0.0475*** 0.0469*** 0.0473*** 0.0665*** 0.0777*** 0.0782*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0107) (0.0099) (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0102) 
Constant 0.1388*** 0.1575*** 0.1645*** 0.3141*** 0.3024*** 0.3147*** 
 (0.0464) (0.0422) (0.0396) (0.0362) (0.0383) (0.0336) 
Observations 7,216 8,916 10,333 9,500 11,457 13,494 
R-squared 0.071 0.075 0.081 0.057 0.061 0.061 
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Appendix Table A.4: Ownership Structure and the Probability of Informed Trading 
This table presents results of the analysis of the impact of margin trading eligibility on the ownership 
structure and the probability of informed trading in NSE stocks. The sample includes all stocks in Groups 1 
and 2 with impact costs close to the cutoff of 1% (based on CCT bandwidths). For each stock, we calculate 
the percentage shares held by foreign investors, institutional investors, individual investors, and 
blockholders/insiders (foreign perc, inst perc, indiv perc, and promoter perc, respectively). We also calculate the 
probability of informed trading for each stock and month (PIN, based on Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and 
Paperman (1996)).  We then regress these dependent variables on the Group 1 dummy as well as its interaction 
term with severedownturn.  The other explanatory variables are defined in Table 3 of the main text.  
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes 
significance at the 5% level; and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES foreign perc inst perc indiv perc promoter perc PIN 
      
Group1 -0.007 -0.001 -0.014 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.015) (0.008) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) 
Group 1*severedownturn -0.051 0.018 0.029 -0.001 0.003 
 (0.048) (0.023) (0.026) (0.006) (0.010) 
Severedownturn 0.011 0.028* -0.000 -0.014*** -0.003 
 (0.039) (0.017) (0.020) (0.004) (0.007) 
Lag std_dret 1.216 0.335 -0.910* 0.033 -0.488***
 (0.792) (0.412) (0.508) (0.109) (0.139) 
Lag mret 0.098*** -0.023 -0.072*** 0.015** 0.022* 
 (0.036) (0.021) (0.027) (0.006) (0.011) 
Lag logvolume -0.056*** 0.001 0.018*** -0.009*** -0.010***
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
Lag R2espread 0.049 0.013 -0.001 0.004 0.011*** 
 (0.042) (0.021) (0.028) (0.006) (0.002) 
Lag R2illiq -0.079** -0.068*** 0.039 0.013**  
 (0.039) (0.022) (0.030) (0.006)  
Lag logmcap 0.108*** 0.058*** -0.092*** 0.021***  
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001)  
Lag_depvar     0.150*** 
     (0.020) 
Constant -1.380*** -1.099*** 2.167*** -0.156*** 0.088*** 
 (0.177) (0.078) (0.113) (0.024) (0.034) 
Observations 2,490 2,490 2,490 2,478 4,985 
R-squared 0.089 0.116 0.148 0.176 0.055 
 
74 
 
Appendix Table A.5: RDD Robustness Tests for Commonality in Returns 
This table presents results of the RDD robustness tests for the impact of margin trading eligibility on commonality in returns. Panel A shows results the 
analysis using alternative bandwidths; Panel D shows the results with local polynomial regressions. The dependent variable is the average R2return during 
month t, where eligibility is effective as of the beginning of month t. All variables are defined in Tables 1 and 3. In Panel A, the regression specification 
is identical to that in Column 4 of Table 7 in the main text. Columns (1) through (6) increase and decrease the CCT bandwidths by increments of 0.02. 
In Panel B, from Column (1) to Column (3), we expand the CCT bandwidths by factors of 1.25 to 1.75 and include impact cost polynomials as well as 
the interaction of impact cost polynomials with Group 1 dummy. Impact cost is centered around the 1% cutoff (i.e., subtract 0.01 from Impact Cost). 
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Alternative Bandwidths  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 +0.02     +0.04 +0.06
VARIABLES R2return R2return R2return R2return R2return R2return 
       
Group 1 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Group 1*severedownturn 0.075*** 0.065*** 0.071*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.045*** 
 (0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
Severedownturn 0.110*** 0.121*** 0.116*** 0.128*** 0.125*** 0.130*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Lag std_dret 2.273*** 1.932*** 1.716*** 1.662*** 1.828*** 1.915*** 
 (0.361) (0.317) (0.284) (0.257) (0.249) (0.236) 
Lag mret -0.054*** -0.045*** -0.048*** -0.038** -0.042*** -0.042*** 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Lag logvolume 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lag logmcap -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.030*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lag depvar 0.179*** 0.184*** 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.190*** 0.193*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Constant 0.485*** 0.467*** 0.477*** 0.489*** 0.507*** 0.499*** 
 (0.073) (0.069) (0.059) (0.055) (0.053) (0.054) 
Observations 3,709 4,455 5,213 6,737 7,537 8,306 
R-squared 0.159 0.159 0.161 0.161 0.165 0.170 
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Panel B. Local Polynomial Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 x1.25 x1.5 x1.75 
VARIABLES R2return R2return R2return 
    
Group1 -0.0047 -0.0038 -0.0102 
 (0.0096) (0.0121) (0.0158) 
Group 1*severedownturn 0.0455*** 0.0417** 0.0375** 
 (0.0166) (0.0162) (0.0147) 
Severedownturn 0.1266*** 0.1317*** 0.1367*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0116) 
Impact Cost -0.0110 -0.0376 -0.2255 
 (0.0651) (0.2033) (0.4060) 
Impact Cost*Group1 -0.0177 0.0853 0.1784 
 (0.0814) (0.2548) (0.4687) 
Impact Cost2  0.1345 1.9909 
  (0.8426) (3.3884) 
Impact Cost2*Group1  0.4109 -2.0537 
  (1.0439) (4.2772) 
Impact Cost3   -4.9933 
   (8.0573) 
Impact Cost3*Group1   4.3529 
   (9.4650) 
Lag std_dret 1.8114*** 1.9974*** 1.9085*** 
 (0.2599) (0.2268) (0.2126) 
Lag mret -0.0410*** -0.0395*** -0.0407*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0134) (0.0133) 
Lag logvolume 0.0199*** 0.0181*** 0.0185*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0020) 
Lag logmcap -0.0293*** -0.0294*** -0.0301*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0020) 
Lag depvar 0.1906*** 0.1882*** 0.1875*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0118) (0.0108) 
Constant 0.4834*** 0.5101*** 0.5260*** 
 (0.0477) (0.0515) (0.0491) 
Observations    
R-squared 7,125 8,681 10,260 
Constant 0.164 0.167 0.167 
 
